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The chapters of this thesis focus on policy-relevant research questions in 
economics of education and labor economics. All chapters make use of randomized 
experiments in order to answer these questions. The second chapter studies 
the returns to medical school in a regulated labor market, by exploiting that 
admittance to medical school in the Netherlands is determined by a lottery. 
The returns to medical school are of particular interest because in the 
Netherlands, and in most countries, the medical profession is highly regulated. 
In chapter three the sunk-costs fallacy in education is investigated, by conducting 
a field experiment with university students. Finally, the third chapter is based 
on a large-scale field experiment that was conducted at the welfare agency in 
Amsterdam. The experiment was set up to evaluate the effect of welfare-to-
work programs on benefit dependency. 
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Introduction
Policy makers increasingly prefer to base their policies on empirical evidence,
which preferably requires knowledge of the causal eﬀects of policies. A causal
eﬀect indicates what would happen in the absence of the policy and is, there-
fore, useful for making predictions about the consequences of policies. A major
problem in the estimation of causal eﬀects is selection bias, which arises from the
fact that participants select themselves or are selected into the program based on
characteristics unobserved by the researcher. Statisticians and social scientists
have developed several statistical approaches to correct for selection problems,
but these methods generally rely on strict assumptions. For example, some ap-
proaches assume that all diﬀerences between participants and non-participants
of the policy can be observed and corrected for. However, characteristics such as
motivation, ability or personality, are not easily observed, while they are likely
to influence outcomes such as employment or income.
One way to circumvent selection issues in the measurement of causal eﬀects
is the usage of randomized experiments. Recently, increased use is being made
of randomized experiments. If individuals are randomly assigned to a program,
participants and non-participants are on average similar in terms of all their
characteristics. A diﬀerence in outcomes between the two groups can then be
attributed to participation in the program. Ideally, such an experiment is carried
out with natural participants in a natural setting. However, in real-life settings,
randomized experiments can be complicated to implement due to practical and
ethical considerations. For example, randomly denying participation in a welfare
program for some people is considered to be problematic. Sometimes policy mak-
ers lend a hand, and introduce randomness into institutional rules that determine
which individuals are selected, thereby yielding a so-called natural experiment.
Exploiting this randomness is an attractive alternative to a field experiment.
Selection issues appear in various policy applications. This thesis will focus
on issues in both labor and education economics. A central question in education
policy is what the private returns are to the field of study. The level of these
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returns can play an important role in the debate about whether tuition fees
should be diﬀerentiated between fields. Measuring the returns (for example in
terms of income) is complicated due to selective enrollment into study programs.
Individuals that choose a certain study program might be diﬀerently motivated
or able than students that choose a diﬀerent field. Diﬀerences in income can
be caused by many factors, of which the study program is only one. In labor
economics, an important question relates to the impacts of active labor market
programs aimed at battling unemployment. Participants in these programs are
typically selected by caseworkers and therefore diﬀer from non-participants. As a
consequence comparing participants and non-participants directly would not be
a measure of the actual impact of such an assistance program.
This thesis consists of three studies that aim to answer questions like these
through the use of randomized experiments. Specifically, the second chapter
studies the returns to medical school in a regulated labor market. While the
literature studying returns to higher education has largely focused on college
completion, earnings diﬀerences between fields given a college degree appear to be
at least as important as the college wage premium. The return to medical school
is of particular interest because in most countries the medical profession is highly
regulated, both on the demand side and the supply side. On the supply side this
is often eﬀectuated by a restriction on the number of places in medical schools.
Standard economic theory suggests that this might result in monopoly rents. It
is, however, diﬃcult to get an estimate of the return to medical school because
observed earnings diﬀerences can also reflect ability diﬀerences of students self-
selecting into medical school. This chapter exploits the unique fact that in the
Netherlands admission to medical school was determined by a lottery, thereby
eliminating this bias. By linking data from the admission lottery at the individual
level with registry data on labor market outcomes, the return to medical school
can be estimated for each year after graduation up to 22 years after application.
In addition, the opportunity costs of spending more time in school can be taken
into account.
It turns out that in every single year after graduation, doctors earn at least 20
percent more than people who end up in their next-best occupation. Estimated
earnings profiles suggest that the lifetime diﬀerence is even larger: 22 years after
the lottery the earnings diﬀerence is almost 50 percent. Only a small fraction
of this diﬀerence can be attributed to diﬀerences in working hours and human
capital investments. The returns do not vary with gender or ability, and appear to
shift the entire earnings distribution. Furthermore, rents are lower for individuals
with a stronger preference for medical school.
The third chapter investigates the eﬀects of tuition fees on student outcomes.
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In many countries education is heavily subsidized. These subsidies can aﬀect stu-
dent eﬀort and performance in two ways. First, higher subsidies attract students
that may be weaker or less motivated than the average student. Second, higher
subsidies may - net of selection - reduce the eﬀort that students put in their stud-
ies through a sunk-cost eﬀect. Whether this second eﬀect plays an important
role is heavily debated. Investigation of the sunk-cost hypothesis is complicated
due to selection bias. Chapter 3 is based on a field experiment, in which Dutch
university students who signed up for a course of extra-curricular tutorial sessions
randomly received a discount on the regular tuition fee. As a result, treated and
control participants have, on average, the same willingness to pay, but the actual
price that they pay diﬀers. The sunk-cost hypothesis predicts that students that
pay less for the course will attend less tutorial sessions.
The results in Chapter 3 indicate that there is no evidence for a sunk-cost
eﬀect on attendance or performance for the full sample. Possibly, income eﬀects
could oﬀset sunk-cost eﬀects. This could be the case if students that pay the full
price decide to work more, and therefore attend fewer classes. This argument
is not supported by the empirical results. Subgroup analysis for students with
above and below median income or students for whom their parents paid for the
course show that there are only minor diﬀerences between these groups. For the
group that, on the basis of hypothetical survey questions, can be categorized
as sunk-cost prone the results do indicate the presence of a sunk-cost eﬀect on
attendance: sunk-cost prone students who receive a larger discount are less likely
to attend their classes. This does not translate into better performance for these
students.
Chapter 4 investigates the eﬀect of mandatory search periods for applicants of
welfare benefits. A search period is issued at the moment of application and dur-
ing this period of four weeks applicants are supposed to actively search for work.
The application for welfare benefits will only be activated if the applicant returns
to the agency after the search period. Normally, the caseworker decides whether
an applicant gets a search period, based on an assessment of the applicant. To
isolate the causal eﬀect of a search period it is evaluated using a field experiment
that incorporated the full population of welfare applicants with potential to work
in the city of Amsterdam. The information from the field experiment is linked to
a very detailed administrative dataset, such that it is possible to determine the
alternative sources of income of participants in the experiment. In addition, this
dataset contains information on moving behavior and crime.
The results indicate that a search period has a strong and persistent negative
eﬀect on the likelihood to receive benefits: It reduces the likelihood to receive
benefits by 20 percentage points. The eﬀect is significantly negative up to six
3
months after registration, and over these months welfare benefits payments are
reduced by 25 percent. There is no spillover to other benefit schemes and the
lower income from welfare benefits is fully compensated (112 percent) by higher
earnings. A search period increases the likelihood to relocate to another munici-
pality, but does not increase the likelihood to engage in criminal activities. This
chapter shows that through stricter job search requirements and an increase in
the complexity of the application process the take-up of welfare benefits can be
significantly reduced.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings and conclusions of the three
chapters in this thesis.
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2
The returns to medical
school in a regulated labor
market: Evidence from
admission lotteries1
2.1 Introduction
This chapter exploits admission lotteries for Dutch medical schools to estimate
the earnings return to completion of medical school. While the literature studying
returns to higher education has largely focussed on college completion, earnings
diﬀerences between fields given a college degree appear to be at least as important
as the college wage premium (Altonji et al., 2012). However, little is known
to what extent these earnings diﬀerences between fields reflect causal returns
(Kirkebøen et al., 2014).
The return to medical school is of particular interest because in most countries
the medical profession is highly regulated, both on the demand side and the
supply side (Simoens and Hurst, 2006). Standard economic theory suggests that
this might result in monopoly rents. Interest in this issue goes back to at least
Friedman and Kuznets (1954), who quantify the rent for US doctors in the 1950s
by comparing their earnings to earnings of dentists, for whom at the time entry
was much less restrictive. They conclude that 16.5 percent of doctors’ earnings is
due to “barriers to entry”, although they note that part of the observed earnings
gap may reflect ability diﬀerences.2 More recently, also using US data, Anderson
1 This chapter is based on Ketel et al. (2015a)
2 Burstein and Cromwell (1985) follow the same approach and find that in 1978–1980 in the
US, the income diﬀerence between doctors and dentists amounts to 35 percent, while the
income diﬀerence between doctors and lawyers is 139 percent.
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et al. (2000) show that doctors in states with higher entry barriers due to stricter
regulations earn significantly higher incomes. Although these studies are highly
suggestive, they are unable to address selectivity issues in a rigorous fashion.3
Returns to medical school are of interest because knowledge about the size of
the rent that doctors earn can assist in deciding whether to relax supply restric-
tions of slots in medical school and/or increase the level of tuition fees. Evidence
about the rent makes these policies of particular interest given that earnings of
doctors and specialists constitute an non-negligible fraction of health cost.4
This chapter contributes to the literature by exploiting admission lotteries to
medical school in the Netherlands. Access to other study programs is in general
not restricted in the Netherlands, so we estimate the returns to medical school
compared to the next-best alternative. The lotteries allow us to eliminate bias
arising from issues such as high ability students self selecting into medical school.
However, because applicants who lose the lottery are allowed to reapply in the
next year and because not all lottery winners complete medical school, we use the
outcome of an individual’s first lottery as instrumental variable for completing
medical school.
We have access to administrative data from the admission lotteries in the
years 1988 to 1999, and of applicants’ subsequent study career from the Dutch
student registry. This information is merged at the individual level with data on
labor market outcomes in the period 1999 to 2010. For the cohort that applied
to medical school in 1988, we thus have labor market information of up to 22
years after application. We present separate estimates for each year since the
first application thereby constructing synthetic experience-earnings profiles. We
can, therefore, estimate long-run returns, but also opportunity costs and internal
rates of return.
We find substantial earnings returns to completing medical school. There is
no single year after graduation in which the returns are less than 20 percent.
The earnings profiles indicate that returns increase with experience. Twenty-two
years after the first lottery doctors have, on average, almost 50 percent higher
earnings. The returns are very similar for men and women, although in absolute
terms men earn more than women. Discounted at two percent the average net
present value of completing medical school is more than a million euros, which
3 Since only graduates of medical school are allowed to practice as a physician, the results of this
chapter also contributes to the literature on occupational licensing (see among others Kugler
and Sauer 2005; Maurizi 1974; Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). The diﬀerence being,
however, that in the current chapter unlicensed individuals do not have the same education
and training as licensed individuals.
4 For example, a recent study for the US estimates that payments to doctors account for 20 per-
cent of health care expenditures: http://www.aetna.com/health-reform-connection/aetnas-
vision/facts-about-costs.html.
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corresponds to an average internal rate of return of 35 percent.
We do not find evidence that these large earnings diﬀerences are driven by
diﬀerences in working hours. While doctors work longer hours than non-doctors,
this diﬀerence is modest. At the start of their career doctors work annually
around 300 hours more, but after four years this diﬀerence decreases to around
100 hours per year. There is also no evidence that doctors are more restricted
in their family lives. Doctors are actually more likely to be married and to have
children.
We do not find diﬀerential returns by ability, where high school GPA measures
ability. Using the approach developed by Imbens and Rubin (1997), we analyze
the marginal distribution of earnings under diﬀerent treatments. This reveals
that the large earnings returns are not only driven by high returns in the top end
of the distribution. Among doctors there are fewer people with zero earnings and
the whole earnings distribution is shifted to the right.
A final contribution of this chapter is that we characterize dynamic compliance
in the context of the sequential randomization of the lotteries. We show that
compliers can be characterized by the number of times they are prepared to
participate in a lottery before dropping out on losing. We interpret this as an
indicator for the motivation to work in the medical profession. We find that the
earnings returns are largest for compliers who want to participate in no more
than a single admission lottery. The earnings returns decrease in the maximum
number of times a complier is prepared to participate in an admission lottery.
Individuals with the lowest preferences for the medical profession have the highest
outcomes if they complete medical school and the lowest outcomes in their next-
best occupation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides further details about the institutional context and the admission lottery
to medical school. Section 2.3 describes the data used in this chapter. Section
2.4 discusses the empirical model and the identification. Section 2.5 presents
the main results, while Section 2.6 assesses the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects
along three dimensions: gender, ability and position in the earnings distribution.
Section 2.7 discusses the interpretation of our results in terms of characterizing
diﬀerent types of compliers. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Background and institutional context
2.2.1 Medical schools in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands a high school diploma makes people eligible for university
studies in all fields and institutions.5 Students choose their field as soon as they
enter university, unlike, for example, in the US where students specialize later.
For the large majority of fields, universities have to accept all applicants but some
fields have a quota, implying that only a fixed number of students are admitted.
Medical school is the most prominent case of a study with a quota. The
quota for medical schools was introduced in 1976. Initially, the motivation be-
hind the quota was to ensure the quality of the study program in a time of
increasing numbers of applicants. More recently, the arguments in favor of the
quota are threefold (RVZ, 2010). First, given the limited capacity of medical
schools, increasing enrollment could reduce the quality of graduates. Second,
since university education is largely publicly funded and medical school is much
more expensive than the average study, educating “too many” doctors would be
wasteful. And finally, there are concerns about supplier-induced demand (Hurley,
2000): educating more doctors could increase the number of medical treatments.
The minister of education oﬃcially sets the size of the quota. Until 1993 the
annual quota was fixed at 1458 students, after which it was gradually expanded
to 1815 students in 1995. In the years relevant for our chapter it remained at this
level. The size of the quota is based on the number of places in specialization
tracks, which is determined by the associations of specialists. For example, the
association of neurologists decides how many places there are available for the
specialization tracks in neurology.
If the number of applicants for medical schools exceeds the quota (which has
always been the case), a lottery determines who is admitted.6 Rejected applicants
are allowed to reapply in the next year, and until 1999 they could do this as often
as they wanted.7 We observe that 69 percent of the rejected first-time applicants
reapply a second time.8
5 Students are tracked into diﬀerent levels when they enter high school at age 12. Only the
highest of three levels ensures direct admittance to university. Around 20 percent of primary
school students enroll in the highest track.
6 Since 2000, medical schools are allowed to admit at most 50 percent of the students using
their own criteria. Medical schools have made increasing use of this, and selection is often
based on motivation and previous experience.
7 In our data, the maximum number of applications of one individual is nine. Since 1999, the
maximum number of applications is limited to three.
8 Alternatively, lottery losers can decide to enroll in medical school abroad. Below we will
present evidence indicating that the share of lottery losers enrolling in a medical school
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Table 2.1: Lottery categories
Category GPA Share Weight
A GPA   8.5 0.02 2.00
B 8.0  GPA < 8.5 0.05 1.50
C 7.5  GPA < 8.0 0.09 1.25
D 7.0  GPA < 7.5 0.21 1.00
E 6.5  GPA < 7.0 0.22 0.80
F GPA < 6.5 0.30 0.67
Other - 0.11 1.00
Note: GPA is grade point average on the final exams in high school. Share is the share of
applicants in the diﬀerent categories that applied for the lotteries in the years 1988-1999. Weight
indicates the relative probability of being admitted. The category other refers to students who
did not participate in the nationwide high school exams, such as foreign students. This category
will be excluded from the analysis
The lottery is weighted such that students with a higher GPA on the high
school exams have a higher probability of being admitted.9 High school exams
are nationwide and externally graded on a scale from one to ten, where six and
above indicates a pass. Table 2.1 shows which GPA intervals are assigned to
the diﬀerent lottery categories - labeled A to F -, together with the shares of
applicants in each category. The category “Other” refers to students who did
not attend high school in the Netherlands and therefore did not participate in
the high school exams, such as foreign students. The final column indicates the
weights in the lottery. This weight determines the ratio of places assigned to a
category over the number of applicants in this category relative to category D.
Hence, someone in category A has a twice as high probability of being admitted
than someone in category D.10
Figure 2.1 shows the admission rates per year by lottery category.11 In the
abroad is at most very small.
9 Graduating from high school requires an exam in seven subjects including Dutch and En-
glish. Applicants for medical school should also have included biology, chemistry, physics and
math and should have passed these subjects. Once the exam is passed it cannot be retaken.
Applicants can thus not retake the exam in order to end up in a higher lottery category.
10The total number of available places are divided over categories A to F such that for the
number of available places divided by the number of applicants in a category, the weights as
in Table 2.1 hold. In case the number of available places in a category exceeds the number
of applicants, all applicants in that category are admitted. For the remaining categories the
weights between the ratios of available places and the number of applicants per category will
remain the same.
11Table 2.i in the appendix contains more detailed information on the admission probabilities
together with the number of applicants per category per year.
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Figure 2.1: Probability of being admitted by year of application
early years applicants in category A are almost certainly admitted but this cat-
egory contains only 2 percent of all applicants (see Table 2.1). The majority of
applicants are in categories C to F, for which the admittance rates range from
35 to 60 percent. Since applicants can participate in multiple lotteries, even-
tually almost 72 percent of all first-time applicants between 1988 and 1999 are
admitted.12
The admission lottery is centrally executed. Applicants are allowed to list
their first three preferred medical schools. After the result from the lottery is
known, admitted students are divided over the medical schools taking account
of their preferences where possible. In the Netherlands, eight universities have
a medical school, which oﬀer programs that are similar in content and quality.
Universities are publicly funded and the nationwide tuition fee is low and the
same for all study programs. There are no private institutes oﬀering the same
education.
The study program of medical schools consists of diﬀerent phases. After
completing four years of mainly theoretical education students receive their un-
dergraduate diploma. To enter the labor market for medical doctors, two more
years of on-the-job training are required. During these first six years students
are entitled to the same general study allowance that all Dutch students receive,
12In 1999 a reform was implemented which implied that applicants with a GPA above 8 (cate-
gory A and B) are automatically admitted. This reform was implemented as a response to a
large public discussion about a girl that finished high school with an exceptional GPA of 9.6
but lost the lottery three times in a row. The weights for the other categories remained the
same.
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and students pay a tuition fee of around 1000 euro per year (at that time). After
the basic medical degree students can choose to specialize or take a PhD. The
specialization track for a general practitioner takes three additional years while
the most advanced specializations such as neurologist, cardiologist or surgeon re-
quire an additional four to six years of training. In order to be hired in one of
the medical specialization tracks it is common to first get a PhD degree. There
are no tuition fees during the PhD and specialization track, and students have a
formal employment contract and receive a salary. In total, the complete medical
education can take between six and 15 years.
2.2.2 The labor market for doctors in the Netherlands
On average, 45 percent of all licensed doctors in the Netherlands are registered as
a specialist.13 General practitioners constitute around 30 percent of the physician
population. The remainder pursues a career as a social doctor (10 percent)14 or
does not specialize at all (15 percent). The latter group can either be non-
specialized doctors that work as a so-called “basisarts” or those that completed a
medical degree, registered as a health care professional but are no longer active
as a doctor. There are gender diﬀerences in the career choices of doctors. Men
are more likely than women to become a specialist (52 versus 39 percent) and
less likely to become general practitioner (25 versus 31 percent), social doctor (8
versus 10 percent), or to never specialize (15 versus 20 percent).
A medical specialist can either become an employee of a hospital or can join a
medical partnership, which is a joint venture of self-employed individuals. Within
hospitals, most specialists (75 percent) are organized in such partnerships (Schafer
et al., 2010). Members of a partnership are considered to be self-employed and are
taxed as such. The hospital buys the services of these partnerships. During our
observation period (1999-2010) two payment regimes applied for self-employed
specialists. From 1999 to 2005, each partnership received a lump-sum payment,
negotiated by local initiatives of partnerships, insurance companies and hospitals.
After 2005, the lump-sum payments were combined with fees per service, in order
to introduce incentives for providing services.
The number of practicing doctors in the Netherlands is 2.9 per 1000 inhab-
itants; close to the OECD average of 3.1.15 Also the division amongst general
practitioners, specialists and other doctors in the Netherlands is close to the
13In order to practice as a physician a doctor needs to be registered in the Dutch registration
of health care professionals.
14The category of social doctors includes, for example, occupational health doctors, doctors for
mentally disabled, community doctors, etc.
15The information in this paragraph comes from OECD (2010).
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OECD average. The same holds for the number of medical graduates; in 2009,
9.9 per 100,000 inhabitants. In terms of remuneration general practitioners in the
Netherlands earn 1.7 or 3.5 times the average income depending on whether they
are regular employees or self-employed. Self-employed GP’s in the UK, Ireland,
Germany and Canada have comparable relative remuneration rates. Specialists
in the Netherlands are well paid at 5.5 times the average income. There is no
other country where this ratio is so high, although also in several other countries
(including Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland and Germany) this ratio exceeds
four.
Doctors with a non-Dutch diploma can practice in the Netherlands if the
Dutch registration authority recognizes their diploma. They often have to follow
a number of years of additional training, depending on the assessment of their
diploma. In the period 2000-2004, 191 non-EU doctors obtained a medical degree
following this procedure (Herfs, 2009). Since 2005 non-EU citizens also have
to pass a language test and a medical ability test. The language tests are a
considerable barrier; in the years 2005-2009 only 19 participants (one quarter
of all participants) passed the tests (Herfs, 2009). For EU-citizens the Dutch
government is not allowed to demand a language requirement, but employers
can. In practice, many employers ask candidates to pass the same language test
as non-EU citizens. There are no exact numbers on the number of foreign doctors
practicing in the Netherlands. By linking information from the Dutch registration
authority to study registrations we observe that 94 percent of the licensed doctors
born after 1970 attended medical school in the Netherlands. The remaining six
percent will be a combination of Dutch students that attended medical school
abroad and foreign doctors that registered in the Netherlands.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data sources and sample
Our data come from three sources. The first source are the administrative records
from the agency (DUO) that registers enrollment of all Dutch students in higher
education and that conducts the admission lotteries. Hence, we observe all appli-
cants for medical school together with their lottery category and the outcomes of
the lotteries. Furthermore, we know the actual study choices of both winning and
losing lottery applicants. Information on study progress is also available as the
agency registers when and whether students successfully complete certain stages.
We have lottery data of individuals that applied for a lottery between 1987
and 2004. Because we are interested in the full history of lottery participation,
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we exclude individuals who participated in the lottery in 1987. For that year, we
cannot observe if participation in the lottery is preceded by losing previous year’s
lottery. Our data show that people very rarely skip lottery years. But if someone
applied in 1986 and next in 1988 (so skipped 1987), we would mistakenly consider
the lottery participation in 1988 as start of the application history. To minimize
such mistakes, we exclude applicants that are older than 20 at the moment of
their first observed application.16 Since 2000, Dutch medical schools can admit at
most 50 percent of their students using their own criteria. Therefore, we exclude
all applicants that applied for the first time after 1999. Finally, applicants in
lottery category A are excluded since almost all of them are eventually admitted
to medical school. This leaves us with 25,551 individuals.
Using social security numbers, the information from DUO is merged to indi-
vidual records of all Dutch citizens kept by Statistics Netherlands. We lose 60
observations without a valid social security number, which are evenly distributed
among the winners and losers of the first lottery (p-value of equality is 0.18). The
records of Statistics Netherlands include information from municipalities, tax au-
thorities and social insurance administrations. Therefore, they contain detailed
information on earnings from various sources, labor supply and characteristics
such as age, gender, ethnicity and marital status. All inhabitants of the Nether-
lands are registered at a municipality, which implies that if a person is not in
our data in a particular year, this person did not live in the Netherlands in that
year. Data from Statistics Netherlands cover the years 1999 to 2010, with the
exception of working hours, which are only available for the years 2006-2010.
Finally, we have records from the BIG-register, that include all health care
professionals in the Netherlands. This register provides information regarding
individual qualifications and entitlement to practice. From this register we know
whether someone is licensed as a doctor.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics separately for winners and losers of their
first lottery.17 The upper part of the table provides information on personal
characteristics. About 60 percent of the applicants is female and the percentage
of women is similar among winners and losers. The average age at the first
application is 18.3. The mean GPA of lottery winners is higher than of lottery
losers, which reflects that GPA determines the weight in the lottery.
16In the Netherlands, the nominal age of finishing high school is 18.
17When there can be no confusion we sometimes refer to winners and losers of their first lottery
as “lottery winners” and “lottery losers”.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics by admission status of the first lottery application
Lottery winners Lottery losers
Personal characteristics
Female 58% 58%
Age at first application 18.3 18.3
Non-western immigrant 8% 8%
GPA high school exams (0-10) 7.06 6.79
Study enrollment and completion
Enrolled in medical school 94% 45%
Completed medical school (by 2010) 83% 41%
Licensed as doctor (by 2008) 80% 42%
Enrolled in study program in the Netherlands 99% 95%
Completed study program in the Netherlands 96% 89%
Labor market outcomes
Annual real (2010) taxable earnings (1999-2010) 39,149 28,268
Annual working hours (2006-2010) 1756 1693
Hourly earnings (2006-2010) 31.5 24.1
Household composition
Married in 2010 51% 45%
Children in 2010 60% 51%
Number of individuals 13,672 11,819
Note: Recall that the lottery is weighted so that the observed diﬀerences between lottery losers
and lottery winners cannot be given a causal interpretation.
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Next, the table presents summary statistics on study enrollment and comple-
tion. The outcome of the first lottery is associated with almost a 50 percentage
point increase in enrollment into medical school. Not everyone who wins the
first lottery actually enrolls in medical school; six percent do not enroll. Among
the losers of the first lottery, 45 percent end up enrolling in medical school (af-
ter winning a subsequent lottery). Of the winners 83 percent complete medical
school, compared to 41 percent for the losers. Finally, almost all individuals
who complete medical school also register as a doctor, and are therefore licensed.
The small diﬀerence between completion and registration rates may be caused
by the fact that completion data currently run to 2010 while the register of li-
censed doctors only runs to 2008. Additionally, for lottery losers it might be that
some individuals obtained a medical degree abroad and afterwards registered as
a doctor in the Netherlands.
For the interpretation of the estimated returns to medical school it is impor-
tant to know which alternatives the lottery losers choose. Most lottery losers
attend a study program in the Netherlands.18 Only five percent of the lottery
losers never register for higher education in the Netherlands. These individuals
may not have enrolled in any study program or may have studied abroad. Of the
lottery participants that do not enroll in medical school but do enroll for Dutch
higher education 32 percent enroll in a health related field. Other regularly cho-
sen fields are Sciences (15 percent), Social and Behavioral Sciences (15 percent),
Engineering (ten percent), Economics (nine percent) and Law (six percent).
Lottery losers are seven percentage points less likely to complete a study pro-
gram. This may be due to the fact that medical schools have much lower dropout
rates than other study programs. It is often argued that this is the consequence
of the intensity of the study program at medical school (more workgroup classes
and fewer exams). Lottery losers also have, on average, a lower ability (GPA),
which may explain their lower graduation rate. This latter explanation is sup-
ported by results from a regression of having a diploma on GPA: Applicants in
lottery category F are seven percentage points less likely to obtain a diploma than
applicants in lottery category B.
The lower part of Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for several labor mar-
ket outcomes. We focus on the following outcomes: earnings, working hours and
hourly earnings. Earnings are measured as the sum of before-tax income from em-
ployment, income from self-employment, income from abroad and other income
from labor. Earnings are observed annually for all residents in the Netherlands.19
18Recall that enrollment for almost all study programs in the Netherlands is unlimited and
unrestricted.
19The fraction of people that live abroad increases over time and is five percent in 2008; this
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All amounts are corrected for the average wage development of university grad-
uates over the observation period and converted to 2010 euros. Table 2.2 shows
that earnings are, on average, around 38 percent higher for winners than for
losers.
Information on working hours is only available for 2006 to 2010 and only for
employed workers. We assume that self-employed workers have a full-time job
(1872 hours per year).20 Average working hours are close to 1700, but winners
work approximately four percent more than losers. This diﬀerence is not suﬃcient
to equalize hourly earnings; these are about 31 percent higher for winners.
Finally, the bottom part of the table shows descriptive statistics for the house-
hold situation in 2010. Winners of the lottery are more likely to be married and
to have at least one child.
2.4 Empirical approach
To estimate the return to medical school we assume a linear relationship between
the labor market outcome of individual i in year t who applied for the first time
to medical school in year ⌧ (Yit⌧ ) and having completed medical school (Di):
Yit⌧ = ↵t +  t ⌧ +  t ⌧Di +Xi t ⌧ + LCi⌧ + Uit⌧ (2.1)
where t   ⌧ indicates the number of years elapsed between the year of the first
lottery and the year in which the outcome is observed. Xi is a vector of controls
including gender, ethnicity and age at first lottery, and LCi⌧ is the interaction
between lottery category and year of first lottery. ↵t and  t ⌧ are fixed eﬀects
for the year in which the outcome is observed and the number of years since the
first application. Uit⌧ is the error term. The parameters of interest are  t ⌧ which
describe the returns to medical school t ⌧ years after first applying. We estimate
equation (2.1) separately for each year since the first lottery participation (t  ⌧).
If high-ability students self-select into medical school, the OLS estimator of
 t ⌧ will be biased. The lottery seems to solve this problem, but completing med-
ical school remains potentially endogenous. Not all admitted students actually
complete medical school, and lottery losers often reapply in subsequent years.
Therefore, we instrument Di with the result (0/1) of the first lottery (LR1i) in
which individual i participated. We estimate a first-stage equation of the form:
fraction is the same for winners and losers.
20In case a person has income both from employment and from self-employment we take
a weighted average: hours worked = hours from employment + (income from self-
employment/total income) * 1872 hours.
16
Di = t ⌧ +  t ⌧LR1i +Xi✓t ⌧ + LCi⌧ + Vit ⌧ (2.2)
The identifying assumption is that conditional on Xi and LCi⌧ the result in the
first lottery is mean independent of Uit⌧ : E[Uit⌧ |Xi, LCi⌧ , LR1i] = E[Uit⌧ |Xi, LCi⌧ ].
Recall from above that individuals have the same probability of being admitted
conditional on year and lottery category. This conditional random assignment
guarantees that the mean conditional independence assumption holds.
In equation (2.2) the parameter  t ⌧ reflects compliance, the diﬀerence in
completion rates between winners and losers of the first lottery.21 Compliance
is not perfect for three reasons. First, not all winners of the first lottery enroll
in medical school. Second, among those who enroll, not everybody completes
medical school. And third, losers can still obtain a medical degree if they win a
subsequent lottery. An interpretation of  t ⌧ is that it describes the fraction of
compliers in the data, which are applicants for whom graduating from medical
school is determined by the result of the first lottery. In Section 2.7 we elaborate
further on the definition of compliers and the interpretation of our estimated
returns to medical school.
By estimating equation (2.1) separately for each year following the first lottery,
we estimate how the earnings diﬀerential develops during the first 22 years after
the first lottery. This period captures the longer study duration in medical schools
compared to alternative studies, and thereby an estimate of the opportunity costs
of the longer investment in human capital.
2.5 The return to medical school
The presentation of the main results is divided into three parts. We first present
and discuss estimates of the eﬀect of medical school on (log) earnings. We then
continue with estimates of the eﬀect of medical school on working hours, (log)
earnings per hour and employment. Finally, we look at the impact of medical
school on family outcomes: being married and having children.
Earnings
We perform our regressions separately by year after the first lottery (t   ⌧),
which implies that each regression uses diﬀerent subsamples. Table 2.3 reports
the estimation results for earnings and log earnings as the outcome variables.
The second column reports the number of observations in each regression and
21Because we perform separate regressions for the number of years since the first lottery (t ⌧),
we also estimate for each value t  ⌧ a separate  .
17
shows how this varies across rows. The final row (t   ⌧ = 22) is only based on
2010-earnings information of people who first applied in 1988. The penultimate
row is based on 2010-earnings information of people who first applied in 1989
and on 2009-earnings information of people who first applied in 1988, and so on.
Because the admission lotteries in our sample end in the same year in which the
earnings data start (1999), also the estimates in the first row are based on just a
single cohort.
The first stage regression describes the eﬀect of winning the first lottery on
the probability to complete medical school. The third column reports first-stage
estimates. The first-stage estimates are highly significant (the F -statistic is never
below 290) and are all close to 0.39. So winning the first lottery increases the
probability to complete medical school with around 39 percentage points.
The fourth column of Table 2.3 presents the instrumental variable estimates
of the eﬀect of completing medical school on annual earnings (in thousands of
euros). The estimates are also plotted in Figure 2.2. During the first six years
after the first lottery the eﬀect is negative or close to zero. The small negative
eﬀect during the first four years can be attributed to two factors. First, students
who are not in medical school more often have a small job while studying than
medical school students. Second, some people that are not admitted to medical
school will decide to work rather than to study. In the fifth and the sixth year after
first applying the negative eﬀect of medical school on earnings is more substantial.
This reflects that most alternative studies have a shorter duration than the six
years required for medical school. Individuals who do not attend medical school
enter the labor market earlier and start receiving income earlier than individuals
attending medical school. The negative earnings eﬀects in the fifth and sixth
years express the opportunity cost of the larger investment in human capital of
people who complete medical school.
The picture reverses from the seventh year onwards when students from med-
ical school graduate and start earning, either in the labor market or while being
employed in a specialization track. From then on the returns to medical school
are always positive and significant. After a big jump in years seven and eight
the earnings diﬀerential remains positive but decreases until the twelfth year; the
20,000 euro per year diﬀerence in the eighth year reduces to less than half of
that in the twelfth year. During that period many students from medical school
are in specialization tracks. Starting wages in specialization tracks are relatively
high but hardly rise while being in the track. From the twelfth year onwards,
students from medical school finish their specialization track and begin working
as a (self-employed) specialist or GP. The earnings diﬀerence increases again and
eventually amounts to almost 40,000 euro per year in the twenty-second year.
18
Table 2.3: Instrumental variable estimates of the eﬀects of completing medical
school on earnings t  ⌧ years after first applying
t  ⌧ N 1st stage Earnings (x€1000) log(Earnings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 2,159 0.36 (0.02)*** -1.1 (0.3)*** -0.36 (0.15)**
1 4,607 0.36 (0.01)*** -2.2 (0.3)*** -0.67 (0.12)***
2 7,167 0.37 (0.01)*** -0.6 (0.2)*** -0.02 (0.08)
3 9,885 0.38 (0.01)*** 0.1 (0.2) 0.07 (0.06)
4 12,438 0.39 (0.01)*** -1.2 (0.3)*** -0.18 (0.06)***
5 14,952 0.39 (0.01)*** -6.6 (0.3)*** -1.35 (0.07)***
6 17,154 0.39 (0.01)*** -10.2 (0.4)*** -1.31 (0.07)***
7 18,945 0.38 (0.01)*** 10.6 (0.7)*** 0.76 (0.06)***
8 20,705 0.38 (0.01)*** 19.0 (0.8)*** 0.85 (0.04)***
9 22,183 0.38 (0.01)*** 13.0 (0.7)*** 0.51 (0.03)***
10 23,484 0.38 (0.01)*** 9.2 (0.6)*** 0.34 (0.03)***
11 24,849 0.38 (0.01)*** 7.3 (0.7)*** 0.21 (0.02)***
12 22,608 0.38 (0.01)*** 7.4 (0.8)*** 0.23 (0.02)***
13 20,117 0.39 (0.01)*** 8.9 (0.9)*** 0.24 (0.02)***
14 17,568 0.39 (0.01)*** 11.0 (1.2)*** 0.25 (0.03)***
15 14,894 0.39 (0.01)*** 15.8 (1.6)*** 0.31 (0.03)***
16 12,410 0.38 (0.01)*** 24.7 (2.2)*** 0.34 (0.03)***
17 9,949 0.39 (0.01)*** 28.8 (2.6)*** 0.40 (0.04)***
18 7,808 0.39 (0.01)*** 30.0 (3.6)*** 0.39 (0.05)***
19 6,056 0.40 (0.01)*** 42.0 (4.1)*** 0.54 (0.06)***
20 4,306 0.41 (0.02)*** 41.4 (5.3)*** 0.49 (0.07)***
21 2,784 0.41 (0.02)*** 42.2 (6.9)*** 0.45 (0.08)***
22 1,430 0.45 (0.03)*** 39.4 (7.3)*** 0.48 (0.12)***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 25,491. * p < 0.10 , **
p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Every cell in this table represents a separate regression, which include
controls for gender, ethnicity, age in the first lottery year, lottery category, year of first lottery
and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category.
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Figure 2.2: Instrumental variable estimates of the eﬀects of completing medical
school on earnings t   ⌧ years after first applying (colored area is 95 percent
confidence interval).
The final column of Table 2.3 shows results for the eﬀect of medical school on
the logarithm of earnings, conditional on having positive earnings. The observed
pattern is very similar to the pattern for the level of earnings (which includes
zeros). During the first six years after the lottery, medical school graduates have
lower log earnings than than they would have had without a medical degree,
and this reverses in the seventh year. From the eleventh year the return steadily
increases up to 0.54 in the nineteenth year. From then on it remains stable around
0.50; in the last year covered by the data the return is 0.48.
In Figure 2.3 we show the predicted earnings profiles for an average individ-
ual with and without completion of medical school. We compute the expected
earnings using
Yit⌧ ⇤Di = ↵t +  t ⌧ +  1,t ⌧Di +Xi t ⌧ + LCi⌧ + Uit⌧ (2.3)
Yit⌧ ⇤ (1 Di) = ↵t +  t ⌧ +  0,t ⌧ (1 Di) +Xi t ⌧ + LCi⌧ + Uit⌧ (2.4)
where both Di in equation 2.3 and 1   Di in equation 2.4 are instrumented
using the result of the first lottery (LRi). The coeﬃcient  1,t ⌧ ( 0,t ⌧ ) gives the
expected earnings of an average individual with (without) completion of medical
school, Yˆ1,t ⌧ (Yˆ0,t ⌧ ). In the figure we assume that individuals first apply to
medical school at age 18. The two expected earnings profiles are indicated by the
two lines in the graph that end at age 40 (since we have data for at most 22 years
after the first application).
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Figure 2.3: Predicted counterfactual earnings levels
To get an idea how these earnings profiles evolve until retirement, we also plot
rescaled average wage profiles of medical school graduates and other university
attenders, where the latter serves as reference group for the “non-doctors”.22 We
regressed the observed average wage profile of medical school graduates on the
predicted wage profile for the years in which we observe both, to obtain the scaling
factor. We repeated this exercise for other university attenders and non-doctors.
The wage profiles show that while being in medical school, students earn less
than if they would have attended another study, or started to work immediately.
At the age of 24, after they have finished medical school, they start earning
substantially more and remain to do so for the rest of their career. We can only
make causal inferences on the eﬀect of completing medical school up to 22 years
after participating in the first lottery, but the fitted earnings profiles suggest that
the earnings diﬀerence is still increasing in the remaining years of the career.
We calculated net present values from completing medical school relative to
the next-best alternative for a representative individual. For the first 22 year
the estimated diﬀerences from Table 2.3 are used, so this takes the opportunity
cost of the longer study period and of the two years of unpaid residencies into
account. We assume that in addition to the 22 years since the first lottery that
were already estimated, an average career lasts another 24 more years. For the
22We have information on all registered doctors in the Netherlands so we can plot their earnings
profile until the (retirement) age of 65. The wage profile for other university attenders is the
average wage profile of all people for whom it is registered that they attended university and
weighted using sampling probabilities. We do not have information on retirement benefits,
so we can only take account of earnings while being active on the labor market.
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earnings diﬀerence in the remaining years we use the diﬀerence between the two
rescaled wage profiles from Figure 2.3. At a discount rate of 0.02 this gives a net
present value of more than one million euros (1,186,609), while at a discount rate
of 0.05 the net present value is still more than half a million euros (505,523). The
internal rate of return equals 35%.
Hours and employment
It is often argued that doctors make longer working hours, which could explain
(part of) the earnings return. Column (3) of Table 2.4 and panel (a) of Figure 2.4
report estimates where annual working hours is the dependent variable. Infor-
mation about hours is only available for the years 2006 until 2010, and therefore
only for the seventh to twenty-second year after the first lottery. The results
reveal that doctors work more hours during the first four years after finishing the
initial phase of their study. During these four years doctors work a total of 1,200
hours more than non-doctors. The average number of working hours during these
four years together is around 6,400 hours, so that doctors work around 20 percent
more than those that did not complete medical school. After these first four years
doctors work about 100 hours more per year than non-doctors. Compared to a
baseline of 1,600 hours this is a six percent diﬀerence. Diﬀerences in working
hours can therefore not explain the large earnings gain to medical school.23 This
is confirmed by the results in column (4) of Table 2.4 (and panel (b) of Figure 2.4)
where log earnings per hour is the dependent variable. The eﬀect on log earnings
per hour is only marginally smaller than the eﬀect on log earnings. From the
eleventh year onwards the gain in the log of per hour earnings increases to 0.43.24
The final column in Table 2.4 (and panel (c) of Figure 2.2) shows the eﬀect
of medical school on the probability of having earnings above the level of welfare
benefits. In the fifth and sixth year after the first lottery students in medical
school have not yet entered the labor market. Therefore, they are less likely to
earn above the level of welfare benefits than those not in medical school. But
this reverses in the seventh year after the first lottery. The eﬀect is particularly
large seven to nine years after the first lottery. While most students from medical
23The estimated eﬀect on hours is downward biased if self-employed doctors work more hours
than the 1872 hours that we imputed for them. This is unlikely to be the case. Leuven et al.
(2013) conducted a survey among around 60 percent of the people that applied to medical
school in the period 1988-1993. One of the survey questions asked about actual working hours
per week. Their 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of medical school on the log of hours worked per
week equals 0.080 (s.e. 0.019), which is close to our estimates. They find no significant eﬀect
on the probability of working more than 60 hours per week (estimate 0.018, s.e. 0.018).
24Calculation of predicted hours for an average individual with and without medical school
reveals that the large eﬀect in years 7 to 9 are mainly driven by the fact that doctors more
often have a full-time job.
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Table 2.4: Instrumental variable estimates of the eﬀects of completing medical
school on labor market outcomes t  ⌧ years after first applying
t  ⌧ N Hours log(Earnings/Hrs) I[Earnings>Welfare]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 2,159 -0.04 (0.02)*
1 4,607 -0.16 (0.02)***
2 7,167 -0.08 (0.02)***
3 9,885 0.02 (0.02)
4 12,438 -0.02 (0.02)
5 14,952 -0.32 (0.02)***
6 17,154 -0.34 (0.02)***
7 18,945 227 (100)** 0.27 (0.05)*** 0.25 (0.02)***
8 20,705 468 (60)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.30 (0.02)***
9 22,183 284 (38)*** 0.19 (0.02)*** 0.19 (0.01)***
10 23,484 253 (29)*** 0.12 (0.02)*** 0.11 (0.01)***
11 24,849 125 (23)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.01)***
12 22,608 133 (22)*** 0.12 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.01)***
13 20,117 128 (22)*** 0.15 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.01)***
14 17,568 121 (22)*** 0.17 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
15 14,894 103 (23)*** 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
16 12,410 63 (25)** 0.29 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.01)***
17 9,949 73 (27)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
18 7,808 69 (27)** 0.35 (0.04)*** 0.03 (0.02)*
19 6,056 80 (30)*** 0.47 (0.04)*** 0.04 (0.02)**
20 4,306 100 (36)*** 0.41 (0.05)*** 0.00 (0.02)
21 2,784 16 (42) 0.43 (0.07)*** 0.02 (0.03)
22 1,430 63 (56) 0.43 (0.10)*** 0.05 (0.04)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 25,491. * p < 0.10 , **
p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Every cell in this table represents a separate regression, which include
controls for gender, ethnicity, age in the first lottery year, lottery category, year of first lottery
and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category.
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Figure 2.4: Instrumental variable estimates of the eﬀects of completing medical
school on labor market outcomes t   ⌧ years after first applying (colored areas
are 95 percent confidence intervals).
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school find (full-time) work immediately after graduating, other students struggle
more finding stable employment. From year ten onwards medical school graduates
are around six percentage points more likely to have earnings above the level of
welfare benefits than other students, relative to a base of 0.89.
Family outcomes
Above we already established that the higher earnings of doctors cannot be at-
tributed to much longer working hours. Here we assess whether doctors sacrifice
in other dimensions. In particular, we look at the impact of completing medical
school on the probabilities of being married and having children (both measured
in 2010). Being less likely to be married or to have children may signal restric-
tions in the possibility to build a family life.25 Our 2SLS estimates point in the
opposite direction. Completion of medical school increases the probability of be-
ing married by 5 percentage points (s.e. 2 percentage points) and the probability
of having children by 8 percentage points (s.e. 2 percentage points).
2.6 Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
We now turn to heterogeneity in the returns to medical school. We first examine
whether returns diﬀer between men and women. While less than half of the uni-
versity students is female in the Netherlands during the period 1988-1999, women
form the majority in medical schools (58 percent is female during our observation
period). This raises the question whether women have a comparative advantage
in medical school. Next we investigate whether returns diﬀer by ability. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2 the admission lottery uses weights based on applicants’
GPA on secondary school exams. Applicants with a higher GPA have a higher
probability of being admitted. This system of a weighted admission lottery justi-
fies the question whether the available places are allocated eﬃciently. Finally, we
study variation in returns over the earnings distribution. This is motivated by
the concern often expressed by policy makers, that some medical specializations
pay very high wages.
Gender
Figure 2.5a shows the estimates of the earnings returns separately for men and
women.26 Until the sixth year both men and women experience an earnings loss
25This assumes that being married and having children represent voluntary choices, while being
single or not having children may not.
26Table 2.ii in the appendix reports the results.
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from studying in medical school. This loss is very similar across genders. In
years seven to 14, the returns are larger for women than for men, but from year
15 onwards men catch up and in the final years the returns to medical school
are slightly larger for men than for women. Figure 2.5b shows that from the
seventh to the tenth year after the first lottery, doctors work longer hours than
non-doctors of the same gender. The diﬀerence is larger for women than for men,
although the eﬀects are not significantly diﬀerent from each other. The eﬀects
on hours disappear after the tenth year, and a bit further in their career male
doctors even work fewer hours than male non-doctors.
Figure 2.6 repeats Figure 2.3 by showing predicted earnings profiles, but now
for men and women separately. These graphs reveal two important facts. First,
while the estimated returns to medical school for men and women are very similar,
earnings levels are much higher for men than for women. Female doctors earn
more or less the same as male non-doctors. Second, while the age-earnings profile
for female doctors seems to flatten out after age 40, the extrapolation of the age-
earnings profile for male doctors suggests that their earnings will still increase
sharply between age 40 and 45. While this result is somewhat more tentative
because it is based on our extrapolation, it is consistent with a larger fraction of
male doctors being medical specialists.
Calculation of net present values of completion of medical school gives, at a
discount rate of 0.02, a value of 1.3 million euros for men and 0.83 million euros
for women. At a discount rate of 0.05 these amounts are 0.54 and 0.38 million
euros. The internal rates of return are 33% for men and 37% for women.
The impact of medical school on family outcomes are somewhat more favorable
for men than for women. For women there is no significant impact on being
married, while for men this is a significant 9 percentage points (s.e. 2 percentage
points). Medical school raises the probability to have children by 5 percentage
points for women and by 12 percentage points for men (both with a s.e. of 2
percentage points).
Ability
The lottery gives applicants with a higher GPA on their secondary school exams
a higher probability to be admitted. This justifies the question whether there is
a diﬀerence in earnings gain between people with diﬀerent GPAs. To examine
this, we estimated earnings returns by year after first lottery separately for lot-
tery categories B to F.27 Figure 2.7 reports the results.28 The estimates for the
27Recall that category A is omitted since there are too few lottery losers in this category.
28The results can also be found in Table 2.iii in the appendix.
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Figure 2.5: IV estimates of eﬀects of medical school completion on earnings and
hours, by year since first lottery and gender (colored areas are 95 percent confi-
dence intervals).
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early and late years of categories B, C and D are not very precise due to small
sample sizes. The results show that the returns are very similar for the diﬀerent
lottery categories with exception of the seventh and eighth year. In these years
returns are higher for a higher GPA. This is probably driven by applicants with a
higher GPA finishing medical school earlier. If we regress time until diploma on
lottery category (conditional on winning the first lottery) we find that students
in category F study, on average, half a year longer than students in category B.
As soon as all students have entered the labor market the returns are very
similar for the diﬀerent lottery categories. We do find that the proportion of ap-
plicants that becomes a specialist increases with GPA. Conditional on completing
medical school, the percentage of specialists decreases monotonically from 59 per-
cent in category B to 42 percent in category F. That we do not find diﬀerences
in the returns for the diﬀerent lottery categories is driven by the worse outside
opportunities that applicants in the lower lottery categories face. Conditional
on winning the first lottery, applicants in category F have a 11 percentage points
lower probability to complete a degree than applicants in category B. Conditional
on losing the first lottery, this diﬀerence is 26 percentage points.
If earnings reflect productivity accurately (both in the medical profession and
in the second-best professions) and if applicants’ GPAs do not respond to changes
in the probabilities to be admitted, this implies that there is no clear support for
a system in which only students with the highest GPA are selected. The only
advantage is that applicants with a high GPA finish their studies faster than
students with a low GPA.
Distributional impact
The common view about the remuneration of doctors in the Netherlands (and
elsewhere) is that especially medical specialists are highly paid. The figures about
the relative pay of GPs and specialists reported in Section 2.2, confirm this.
This suggests that the earnings gain is distributed unequally across the earnings
distribution. To inquire this further we estimate the marginal distribution of the
outcome under diﬀerent treatments for the subpopulation of compliers, following
Imbens and Rubin (1997).29
Figure 2.8 plots the estimated earnings distributions for winning and losing
compliers 12, 16, 18 and 20 years after the first lottery. We see that in all these
years after the first lottery the distribution of winning compliers has less mass at
low incomes than the distribution for losing compliers. After 12 years there is very
little dispersion in winning compliers’ earnings. This is the time when they do
29Their method is briefly explained in Appendix 2.B.
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Figure 2.7: IV estimates of eﬀects of medical school completion on earnings, by
year since first lottery and lottery category
their specialization tracks in which wages are fixed. After 16 years most winning
compliers will have finished their specialization track, and the density function of
the winning compliers has a similar shape but is shifted to the right compared to
the losing compliers. After 18 years the earnings of winning compliers are more
dispersed and the right tail of the winning compliers becomes much fatter, which
implies that there are more top earners among the winning compliers. This is
even more pronounced after 20 years. These figures show that the earnings gains
from medical school that we found in Section 2.5 are not only driven by high gains
in the top end of the distribution. Among the winning compliers there are always
fewer people who have zero earnings and the distribution of winning compliers is
to the right of the distribution of losing compliers.
2.7 Interpretation
2.7.1 Degrees of compliance
In this section we discuss the interpretation of the estimated returns to medical
school. The instrumental variable approach identifies the average returns to med-
ical school for applicants who comply with the result of the first lottery. Following
Imbens and Angrist (1994), we can interpret our estimator in terms of potential
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outcomes:
E[Y |LR1 = 1]  E[Y |LR1 = 0]
P (D = 1|LR1 = 1)  P (D = 1|LR1 = 0) =
E[Y (1)  Y (0)|D(LR1 = 1) D(LR1 = 0) = 1] (2.5)
where Y (1) and Y (0) are potential outcomes with and without medical school, re-
spectively, and D() is an indicator for completing medical school if the expression
in parentheses holds.
Recall that individuals who lose an admission lottery can reapply in the next
year. Even though participating in the admission lottery is free, engaging in a
subsequent lottery might be considered costly since individuals postpone enter-
ing the labor market. These subsequent lotteries allow us to characterize the
compliers in more detail. This is interesting because it can provide information
on how earnings returns interact with (other) preferences for completing medical
school. One might expect individuals with high earnings returns and individuals
with strong preferences for completing medical school to actually participate in
subsequent lotteries after losing an admission lottery. This implies that if prefer-
ences and earnings returns are independent, the returns to medical school should
be higher for individuals who are willing to participate in multiple lotteries.
So far, we used the result of the first lottery in which someone participated
as instrumental variable. Compliers with this instrument are individuals who
complete medical school when winning the first lottery, and do not complete
medical school when losing the first lottery. The latter is true for (i) applicants
who do not reapply after losing the first lottery and for (ii) applicants who reapply
one or more times but always lose. The first group seems to meet the concept of
compliance closer than the second group.30
Therefore, we next define compliers in terms of the maximum number of times
they are willing to participate in an admission lottery. “First-degree” compliers
are individuals who complete medical school when winning their first lottery and
do not reapply when losing this lottery. “Second-degree” compliers reapply only
one more time when losing their first lottery and complete medical school when
winning their first or second lottery. And similarly, we can define “third-degree”
compliers and so on. The more often someone reapplies, the closer he or she
conceptually is to an always taker. Below we show how we use the information
about subsequent lotteries to separately identify the earnings returns to medical
30A third possible group would be applicants who complete medical school when winning the
first lottery and who reapply when losing the first lottery but don’t complete medical school
when they win one of the subsequent lotteries. We rule this group out and assume that
applicants who don’t complete medical school when winning subsequent lotteries would also
not complete medical school when winning the first lottery, and are thus never takers.
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school for the diﬀerent degrees of compliers.
We simplify the analysis to five types of applicants: first-degree, second-degree
and third-degree compliers, never takers and always takers. Always takers are
people who participate in at least four lotteries and complete medical school when
being admitted. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to more groups of
compliers, and as will become clear below, defining always takers as people who
intend to participate in four or more lotteries does not aﬀect the estimates for the
diﬀerent complier groups. Never takers are people who do not complete medical
school irrespective of the result of the lotteries. By imposing monotonicity, we
exclude defiers.
We first want to identify the shares of the five groups from our data. Let Lk
be a dummy variable indicating whether a person would apply for the kth lottery;
1 if yes, otherwise 0. LRk is a dummy variable indicating whether a person
won the kth lottery (conditional on participating); 1 if yes, otherwise 0. CN is a
variable indicating whether the person is a never taker, 1 if yes, otherwise 0. The
proportion of never takers can be identified from the data as the proportion of
winners of the first lottery that do not complete medical school:
Pr(CN = 1) = Pr(D = 0|LR1 = 1)
Next, let Ck be a variable describing whether the person is a kth degree complier.
A first-degree complier does not reapply after losing the first lottery, and com-
pletes medical school when being admitted in the first lottery. The proportion of
first-degree compliers can be identified by taking the proportion of losers of the
first lottery that do not participate in a second lottery and correct for the fact
that part of them are never takers:
Pr(C1 = 1) = (1  Pr(CN = 1)) Pr(L2 = 0|LR1 = 0)
Similarly, we consider the second-degree and third-degree compliers:
Pr(C2 = 1) = (1 Pr(CN = 1)) Pr(L3 = 0|LR2 = 0, L2 = 1)Pr(L2 = 1|LR1 = 0),
and,
Pr(C3 = 1) = (1  Pr(CN = 1)) Pr(L4 = 0|LR3 = 0, L3 = 1)
Pr(L3 = 1|LR1 = 0, LR2 = 0)Pr(L2 = 1|LR1 = 0).
Finally, let CA be a variable indicating whether the person is an always taker.
Given that we already characterized the four other groups, the probability of
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being an always taker is:
Pr(CA = 1) = 1  Pr(C3 = 1)  Pr(C2 = 1)  Pr(C1 = 1)  Pr(CN = 1)
For tractability we impose that the probability of being a never taker is the same
in every lottery, which is consistent with our data. In each lottery the fraction of
admitted students that does not complete medical school is very similar.3132
Next, we consider the probability of being a complier in our empirical analy-
ses, which are individuals for whom the outcome of the first lottery determines
whether or not to complete medical school. This holds for first-degree compliers,
as well as for second-degree and third-degree compliers who lose all subsequent
lotteries after the first lottery:
E[Y (1)  Y (0)|D(LR1 = 1) D(LR1 = 0) = 1] =
P (C1 = 1) + P (C2 = 1)P (LR2 = 0) + P (C3 = 1)P (LR2 = 0)P (LR3 = 0) (2.6)
Using this characterization of the compliers in our estimations, we can then
rewrite the right hand-side of equation (2.5) as a weighted average of the potential
outcomes for the diﬀerent groups of compliers:
E[Y |LR1 = 1]  E[Y |LR1 = 0]
P (D = 1|LR1 = 1)  P (D = 1|LR1 = 0) =
(E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C1 = 1]P [C1 = 1]
+ E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C2 = 1]P [C2 = 1]P [LR2 = 0]
+ E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C3 = 1]P [C3 = 1]P [LR2 = 0]P [LR3 = 0])/
(P [C1 = 1] + P [C2 = 1]P [LR2 = 0] + P [C3 = 1]P [LR2 = 0]P [LR3 = 0]) (2.7)
We now restrict the sample to people who lost their first lottery and applied
for the second lottery. For these applicants, the result of the second lottery is
random (conditional on the lottery category). Again using instrumental variables
estimation, we estimate for the compliers to the result of the second lottery the
earnings returns to medical school. This group of compliers to the result of the
second lottery consists of second-degree as well as third-degree compliers who
lose the third lottery. Recall that first-degree compliers never get to the second
lottery.
31In the first lottery the fraction of never takers is 0.176. For the second and third lottery these
fractions are 0.181 and 0.164, respectively.
32The shares of the diﬀerent types of compliers can also be computed using the first-stage
regressions discussed below. Obviously, this yields very similar results.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of earnings returns to medical school for diﬀerent degrees
of compliers, by year since last lottery participation
Years since Compliers
last lottery 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree
0 -1.9 (0.7)*** -1.2 (0.6)** -1.1 (0.6)*
1 -3.1 (0.5)*** -1.4 (0.4)*** -1.7 (0.5)***
2 0.0 (0.4) -0.1 (0.5) 0.2 (0.5)
3 0.7 (0.5) -0.4 (0.5) -1.1 (0.9)
4 -2.0 (0.6)*** -4.0 (0.8)*** -4.8 (0.8)***
5 -9.6 (0.7)*** -11.2 (0.7)*** -11.7 (0.9)***
6 -10.9 (0.8)*** -13.3 (0.9)*** -13.8 (1.1)***
7 33.0 (1.7)*** 16.6 (2.0)*** 0.2 (1.6)
8 29.4 (2.4)*** 19.2 (1.6)*** 7.1 (1.7)***
9 12.1 (1.4)*** 8.6 (1.3)*** 3.6 (1.6)**
10 10.2 (1.3)*** 3.7 (1.3)*** 2.7 (1.6)*
11 10.3 (1.4)*** 4.7 (1.6)*** 1.7 (1.8)
12 10.2 (1.6)*** 3.6 (1.8)** -0.7 (2.5)
13 14.2 (2.0)*** 8.8 (2.6)*** 2.5 (4.7)
14 15.5 (2.7)*** 10.7 (3.9)*** 10.2 (6.6)
15 22.3 (3.7)*** 12.3 (5.2)** 13.2 (8.1)
16 35.2 (4.5)*** 22.9 (6.4)*** 7.0 (11.4)
17 35.0 (5.7)*** 22.2 (8.6)*** 0.4 (13.2)
18 37.2 (7.3)***
Note: Robust standard errors for third degree compliers and bootstrapped standard errors (500
replications) for 1st degree and 2nd degree compliers in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 ,
*** p < 0.01 .
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The Wald estimate using applicants to the second lottery can be expressed
as a weighted average of potential outcomes of second-degree and third-degree
compliers:
E[Y |LR2 = 1]  E[Y |LR2 = 0]
P (D = 1|LR2 = 1)  P (D = 1|LR2 = 0) =
(E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C2 = 1]P [C2 = 1]
+ E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C3 = 1]P [C3 = 1]P [LR3 = 0])/
(P [C2 = 1] + P [C3 = 1]P [LR3 = 0]) (2.8)
Repeating the instrumental variables estimation for applicants to the third lottery
gives the earnings returns for compliers to the result of the third lottery. Given
our assumption that there only three degrees of compliers, this group only consists
of third-degree compliers. This gives the following expression:
E[Y |LR3 = 1]  E[Y |LR3 = 0]
P (D = 1|LR3 = 1)  P (D = 1|LR3 = 0) = E[Y (1)  Y (0)|C3 = 1] (2.9)
With the estimate of the earnings returns for third-degree compliers in equation
(2.9) and estimates of the shares of second-degree and third-degree compliers, we
can recursively compute the earnings returns for second-degree compliers from
equation (2.8). Likewise, with estimates of the earnings returns of third-degree
and second-degree compliers and of the shares of first-degree, second-degree and
third-degree compliers, we recover the earnings returns for first-degree compliers
from equation (2.7).
2.7.2 Complier return heterogeneity
Table 2.iv report IV estimates of the earnings returns to medical school by year
since first lottery using the result of the first, second and third lotteries as instru-
mental variables. The results in the first column repeat those from column (4)
in Table 2.3, the results in the second column are obtained when restricting the
sample to people who lost the first lottery and apply to the second. Likewise the
results in the third column are obtained when restricting the sample to people
who lost the first and second lotteries and apply to the third.
Table 2.5 presents the results for the diﬀerent degrees of compliers. To correct
for the fact that second-degree and third-degree compliers start their studies later,
we now present the results for the number of years since the last lottery. The re-
sults in the third column pertain to third-degree compliers, for whom the results
are identical to the estimated return using only participants of the third lottery
(from table 2.iv). Using the procedure outlined above, the first two columns
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Figure 2.9: Estimates of earnings returns to medical school completion for diﬀer-
ent lotteries and degrees of compliers, by year since last lottery
present estimates of the earnings returns for first-degree and second-degree com-
pliers.33 For some years after the last lottery, the numbers of observations are
rather small and the estimates imprecise, but for the years with enough obser-
vations the pattern seems clear. The earnings returns for first-degree compli-
ers are larger than for second-degree compliers, which in turn is larger than for
third-degree compliers. Figure 2.9 shows the returns for the diﬀerent degrees of
compliers in a graph.
As stated above, if individual’s preferences for medical school and returns to
medical school would be independent, we would expect returns to medical school
to be higher for individuals who are willing to participate in more admission lot-
teries. The results show the opposite pattern, higher-degree compliers have lower
earnings returns than the lower-degree compliers. This can only be explained if
preferences for medical school are negatively related to earnings returns.
Figure 2.10 shows the predicted levels of earnings for diﬀerent degrees of
compliers. The eﬀect we find seems to be mainly driven by the diﬀerence in
earnings as a doctor between diﬀerent degrees of winning compliers: Winning
first-degree compliers earn more than winning third-degree compliers. The dif-
ference in earnings for diﬀerent degrees of losing compliers are smaller, but the
33Averaged over all the lottery years, the estimated shares of the diﬀerent groups are: 0.238
for first-degree compliers, 0.252 for second-degree compliers, 0.164 for third-degree compliers,
0.1739 for always takers, and 0.173 for never takers. The probability to lose the first lottery
(Pr(LR1 = 0)) equals 0.545. For the second and third lotteries these probabilities are 0.580
and 0.566, respectively. In the analysis we estimate the diﬀerent shares of compliers separately
for each year since the first lottery.
37
pattern is reversed: Losing third-degree compliers earn more than losing first-
degree compliers. A tentative conclusion could be that first-degree compliers are
less motivated, both when it comes to reapplying for medical school as to their
performance in their second best option. Third-degree compliers on the other
hand, try harder to get in to medical school and are more motivated to make the
best out of their second best option when they do not manage to get into medical
school.
2.8 Conclusion
Our empirical results provide evidence of substantial earnings returns to medical
school. In each year after graduating these returns are at least 20 percent com-
pared to the second-best study, and the returns increase to almost 50 percent 22
years after first applying to medical school. Only a small part of this earnings
diﬀerence can be attributed to diﬀerences in working hours or more investment in
human capital. If we interpret the remainder of the earnings returns as monopoly
rent, this also explains why the number of applicants is substantially higher than
the number of available slots in medical schools.
Releasing the quota might reduce the monopoly rents of doctors. If we as-
sume that earnings in the applicant’s next-best option are not influenced by a
release of the quota such a release can reduce doctors’ earnings to the level in
their next-best option.34 Releasing the quota is costly in a situation in which
the government heavily subsidizes study costs, as is currently the case in the
Netherlands. The costs of attending medical school are much higher than the
costs of other study programs. The total costs of attending medical school are
estimated to be at least 167,000 euros compared to an average amount of 55,000
euros for other university study programs (Houkes-Hommes, 2009).35 Students
pay only a tuition fee of around 1000 euros per year, which is not diﬀerentiated
across studies. Furthermore, the majority of the medical school students starts
a specialization track. The costs of a specialization track are completely covered
by the government and range from 40,000 to 145,000 euro.36
Releasing the quota may not only increase public expenditures on university
34Earnings levels in applicants’ next-best option will be aﬀected if releasing the quota signif-
icantly reduces labor supply in these sectors. In most alternative fields in which rejected
medical school applicants apply they form only a small proportion of the total amount of
students (for example law or psychology), so this is not likely to be the case.
35Part of the diﬀerence in costs reflects the fact that medical school takes longer than the
alternative study programs.
36The specialization tracks are an exception among other post-graduate programs; in most cases
the government does not bear the (full) costs of post-graduate education.
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Figure 2.10: Predicted earnings for diﬀerent degree compliers
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education, but it is often argued that due to supplier-induced demand also health-
care costs may increase. However, one might question whether the coexistence
of high private returns and high public investment is desirable. Policy makers
can either consider maximizing earnings for individuals in the medical profession
or shift part of the study costs to students. Our results suggest that there is
suﬃcient scope for medical school students to pay a larger share of their study
costs. This might also allow the government to increase the number of available
places without increasing public expenditures. At the same time higher costs can
reduce the number of applicants for medical school. An increase in the supply of
doctors and the resulting reduction of their earnings will also reduce the number
of applicants.
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2.A Appendix tables
Table 2.i: Fraction p admitted and number of applicants N by year and lottery
category (A–F)
A B C D E F Total
Year p (N) p (N) p (N) p (N) p (N) p (N) p (N)
1988 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.75 0.62 0.54 0.67
(29) (96) (179) (495) (537) (749) (2085)
1989 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.80 0.66 0.58 0.71
(30) (84) (158) (429) (531) (697) (1929)
1990 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.71 0.59 0.51 0.64
(36) (111) (194) (468) (571) (746) (2126)
1991 1.00 0.89 0.76 0.63 0.50 0.43 0.56
(41) (130) (201) (547) (649) (881) (2449)
1992 1.00 0.84 0.72 0.59 0.48 0.42 0.53
(51) (113) (235) (600) (689) (1036) (2724)
1993 0.93 0.72 0.62 0.51 0.41 0.36 0.45
(44) (167) (241) (702) (847) (1299) (3300)
1994 0.89 0.69 0.58 0.48 0.39 0.33 0.43
(61) (208) (389) (905) (1034) (1331) (3982)
1995 0.80 0.62 0.51 0.41 0.34 0.31 0.39
(88) (265) (430) (982) (1024) (1402) (4191)
1996 0.74 0.58 0.48 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.36
(97) (283) (494) (1084) (1119) (1496) (4573)
1997 0.72 0.54 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.35
(117) (310) (498) (1114) (1129) (1486) (4654)
1998 0.75 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.37
(106) (332) (492) (1121) (1041) (1325) (4417)
1999 1.00† 1.00† 0.52 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.43
(87) (341) (421) (1025) (898) (1146) (3918)
Total 0.86 0.73 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.36 0.46
(787) (2440) (3932) (9472) (10,069) (13,594) (40,294)
Note: In 1999 a reform was implemented which implied that from that year on applicants with
a GPA above 8 (category A and B) are automatically admitted.
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Table 2.ii: IV estimates of eﬀects of medical school completion on earnings and
hours, by year since first lottery and gender
t  ⌧ Earnings (x€1000) Hours
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 -1.5 (0.6)*** -0.8 (0.4)**
1 -2.3 (0.5)*** -2.2 (0.3)***
2 -0.5 (0.5) -0.7 (0.3)**
3 0.1 (0.5) 0.0 (0.3)
4 -1.5 (0.4)*** -1.0 (0.3)***
5 -5.1 (0.6)*** -7.8 (0.4)***
6 -7.6 (0.6)*** -12.2 (0.5)***
7 6.5 (1.0)*** 14.0 (1.0)*** 169 (160) 268 (128)**
8 13.8 (1.4)*** 23.3 (1.1)*** 277 (98)*** 601 (76)***
9 10.5 (1.0)*** 15.0 (0.8)*** 146 (63)** 385 (48)***
10 7.9 (1.1)*** 10.3 (0.8)*** 199 (47)*** 288 (35)***
11 5.4 (1.1)*** 8.7 (0.8)*** 88 (36)** 150 (31)***
12 4.9 (1.3)*** 9.5 (0.9)*** 122 (32)*** 142 (30)***
13 7.0 (1.5)*** 10.6 (1.1)*** 105 (30)*** 149 (31)***
14 8.6 (2.1)*** 13.0 (1.4)*** 112 (29)*** 134 (33)***
15 15.3 (2.8)*** 16.2 (1.8)*** 114 (29)*** 100 (35)***
16 29.8 (3.9)*** 20.5 (2.4)*** 62 (34)* 67 (36)*
17 36.9 (4.8)*** 22.8 (2.8)*** 71 (37)* 82 (38)**
18 35.2 (6.8)*** 26.2 (3.6)*** 50 (36) 85 (40)**
19 52.6 (7.8)*** 34.5 (4.2)*** 71 (40)* 90 (42)**
20 47.2 (10.1)*** 36.7 (5.4)*** 76 (48) 122 (51)**
21 41.9 (12.6)*** 41.0 (7.4)*** -14 (52) 42 (62)
22 36.3 (12.7)*** 40.0 (8.2)*** -35 (68) 151 (85)*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 25,491, of which 10,661
are men and 14,880 are women. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Every cell in this table
represents a separate regression, which include controls for ethnicity, age in the first lottery
year, lottery category, year of first lottery and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and
lottery category.
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Table 2.iv: Estimates of earnings returns to medical school for diﬀerent lotteries,
by year since first lottery participation
Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 3
t  ⌧ N IV N IV N IV
0 2159 -1.1 (0.3)*** 879 0.1 (0.4) 280 0.2 (0.9)
1 4607 -2.2 (0.3)*** 1898 -0.9 (0.4)** 674 -0.1 (0.7)
2 7167 -0.6 (0.2)*** 2995 -1.3 (0.3)*** 1043 -1.1 (0.6)*
3 9885 0.1 (0.2) 4243 -0.5 (0.3)* 1500 -1.7 (0.5)***
4 12,438 -1.2 (0.3)*** 5374 -0.2 (0.3) 1911 0.2 (0.5)
5 14,952 -6.6 (0.3)*** 6371 -3.2 (0.5)*** 2263 -1.1 (0.9)
6 17,154 -10.2 (0.4)*** 7245 -9.4 (0.5)*** 2546 -4.8 (0.8)***
7 18,945 10.6 (0.7)*** 7854 -12.8 (0.6)*** 2731 -11.7 (0.9)***
8 20,705 19.0 (0.8)*** 8394 8.0 (1.4)*** 2873 -13.8 (1.1)***
9 22,183 13.0 (0.7)*** 8688 13.9 (1.0)*** 2926 0.2 (1.6)
10 23,484 9.2 (0.6)*** 8886 8.2 (0.9)*** 2944 7.1 (1.7)***
11 24,849 7.3 (0.7)*** 9102 3.7 (0.9)*** 2971 3.6 (1.6)**
12 22,608 7.4 (0.8)*** 8190 4.1 (1.0)*** 2676 2.7 (1.6)*
13 20,117 8.9 (0.9)*** 7142 3.1 (1.2)** 2259 1.7 (1.8)
14 17,568 11.0 (1.2)*** 6059 6.0 (1.8)*** 1904 -0.7 (2.5)
15 14,894 15.8 (1.6)*** 4840 8.4 (2.4)*** 1453 2.5 (4.7)
16 12,410 24.7 (2.2)*** 3767 11.7 (3.3)*** 1067 10.2 (6.6)
17 9949 28.8 (2.6)*** 2803 20.4 (4.2)*** 731 13.2 (8.1)
18 7808 30.0 (3.6)*** 1962 18.7 (5.8)*** 465 7.0 (11.4)
19 6056 42.0 (4.1)*** 1363 19.1 (8.0)** 291 0.4 (13.2)
20 4306 41.4 (5.3)*** 829 8.2 (12.0) 146 -23.8 (24.1)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The total number of individuals in lottery 1, 2
and 3 are respectively 25,491, 9,363 and 3,110. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Every
cell in this table represents a separate regression, which include controls for gender, ethnicity,
age in the first lottery year, and for each lottery the lottery category in that lottery, year of
lottery and interaction terms of the year of lottery and lottery category. Years 21 and 22 are
omitted as the sample size is too small for these years.
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2.B Estimation of outcome distributions for com-
pliers
Imbens and Rubin (1997) show how to derive distributions of outcome for both
winning and losing compliers. Below we briefly review this approach. Yi(1) and
Yi(0) denote the potential earnings with and without completing medical school,
respectively. For each observation we observe the triple (LR1i, Di, Yi). We cannot
directly identify compliers from the data, but we can identify some never takers
(for whom LR1i = 1 and Di = 0) and some always takers (LR1i = 0 and Di = 1).
Because of the randomization, the instrument will be independent of a person’s
type, so in a large sample we can infer the distribution of Yi(1) for always takers
and Yi(0) for never takers. These distributions are described by ga(y) and gn(y).
Furthermore we know the population proportions  c, a and  n of compliers,
always takers and never takers, respectively.
The distributions of interest are the distributions of Yi(0) and Yi(1) for com-
pliers, denoted as gc0(y) and gc1(y). These cannot be observed directly from the
data because the group of lottery losers that do not complete medical school (with
LR1i = 0 and Di = 0) consists of compliers and never takers. Analogously, in the
outcome distribution of lottery winners that complete medical school (LR1i = 1
and Di = 1) there will be compliers and always takers.
We write the directly estimable distributions of Yi for the subsample defined
by LR1i = lr and Di = d as flr,d(y). This implies that ga(y) = f01(y) and
gn(y) = f10(y). Imbens and Rubin (1997) show that the distributions for the
winning and losing compliers can be expressed in terms of the directly estimable
distributions in the following way:
gc0(y) =
 n +  c
 c
f00(y)   n
 c
f10(y), (2.10)
and,
gc0(y) =
 a +  c
 c
f11(y)   a
 c
f01(y). (2.11)
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3
Tuition fees and sunk-cost
effects1
3.1 Introduction
Education is heavily subsidized around the world. These subsidies can lower
student eﬀort and performance through two channels. First, higher subsidies
attract more students and the additional students may be weaker or less motivated
than the average student.2 Second, higher subsidies may – net of selection –
reduce student eﬀort through a sunk-cost eﬀect (Thaler, 1980; Arkes and Blumer,
1985). Students who pay less for their study may have lower psychological costs
of failing their studies than students who pay the full price. In this chapter we
present the results of a field experiment which examines this second channel.3
We run a field experiment in which we randomly subsidize Dutch university
students who have signed up for a course of extra-curricular tutorial sessions.
When participants come to pay the oﬀer price, they may randomly receive an un-
expected discount. As a result treated and control participants have, on average,
the same willingness to pay, but the actual transaction prices they paid diﬀer.
The size of the discount is determined by randomly picking a closed envelope, so
participants have no reason to believe that the discount is related to the quality
of the course.
Sunk-cost eﬀects can operate through loss aversion, through a taste for consis-
tency or through psychological commitment (Ashraf et al., 2010).4 Thaler (1980)
1 This chapter is based on Ketel et al. (2015b)
2 Studies showing that lower tuition fees or more financial aid increase enrollment include Van
der Klaauw (2002), Kane (2003) and Dynarski (2003).
3 A third channel, potentially operating in the opposite direction, is an income eﬀect. Students
who pay the full price have reduced wealth, and may, therefore, work more and “consume”
fewer tutorial sessions. We assess the importance of income eﬀects for our study in Section
3.4.
4 While tuition fees may trigger some psychological commitment, such pay-in-advance purchases
47
discusses not ignoring sunk costs as one of various deviations from the rational
maximizing model that follow from Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory.
Eyster (2002) presents a model in which people have a taste for rationalizing
past actions by taking current actions for which those past actions were optimal.
Having spend a larger amount of money on an extra-tutorial course in the past
may then lead to a higher probability of attending a session today.
If the sunk-cost eﬀect would be the only bias to which students are subject, it
could make them spend more than the optimal amount of eﬀort on their educa-
tion.5 There is, however, ample evidence that due to present bias – the tendency
to place too much weight on the present compared to the future relative to the
comparison of two future dates (see e.g. Frederick et al. (2002)) –, students gen-
erally spend too little eﬀort on their studies (Koch et al., 2014).6 Education
requires a large investment upfront, in tuition, time and eﬀort. A present-biased
student may be unwilling to make such investments, even if the rewards justify
the costs from the perspective of the student herself when both costs and rewards
are still in the future. However, due to the sunk-cost eﬀect an initial investment
in terms of (high) tuition fees can oﬀset the present bias.7 This would be partic-
ularly eﬀective if, as seems plausible, it is mainly the daily study eﬀort which is
aﬀected by the present bias rather than the more carefully considered financial
investment in tuition fees.
There is surprisingly little solid empirical evidence about the sunk-cost bias.
For a long time, only Arkes and Blumer (1985) provided evidence. They demon-
strate the sunk-cost eﬀect by randomly providing theater patrons with a discount.
Participants who received a discount visited the theater significantly less often.
This is, however, only the case for the first half of the theater season; in the
second half diﬀerences between the discount and the no-discount group are no
longer significant.8
should not be labeled “commitment devices” according to Bryan et al. (2010), because they
do not make certain – currently undesirable – future choices more expensive.
5 Although this should be considered relative to the money and eﬀort sunk on other activities
which compete for their time. E.g. if students have sunk a large amount of money and/or
eﬀort into their membership of a fraternity or sports team money spend on college tuition
may oﬀset these sunk-cost eﬀects.
6 For example, Levitt et al. (2012) find that rewards to perform well on a test only have
an impact when students know that payment is immediate, and not when they know that
payment is delayed. This holds for financial rewards as well as for non-financial rewards.
7 Education subsidies may also help to overcome present bias as they lower the required invest-
ment. Larger financial aid to students combined with higher tuition fees may be a way out
of this dilemma.
8 The sunk-cost bias has also been investigated in laboratory experiments. Phillips et al. (1991)
report that some participants exhibit the sunk-cost eﬀect when they value lottery tickets, while
others experience the reverse eﬀect. Friedman et al. (2007) find a small sunk-cost bias in a
search task, but the results are very sensitive to the details of the task. Oﬀerman and Potters
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Three recent studies investigate the sunk-cost eﬀect in field experiments in
developing countries. Ashraf et al. (2010) conducted an experiment in a door-
to-door sale of a water purification product to about one thousand households
in Zambia. To disentangle selection eﬀects from the sunk-cost eﬀect, they use a
clever two-stage pricing design that created random and orthogonal variation in
oﬀer prices and transaction prices. Two weeks after the sale, data were collected
concerning usage of the product. The study finds no evidence of a sunk-cost
eﬀect: households that pay a higher transaction price are not more likely to
use the product. If, however, paying a positive price is compared to paying
nothing, the point estimates are consistent with the sunk-cost eﬀect, but are not
significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Cohen and Dupas (2010) use a similar two-stage design to estimate the impact
of the oﬀer and transaction prices on the use of antimalarial insecticide-treated
bed nets oﬀered by prenatal clinics to pregnant women in Kenya. They also fail
to find a significant sunk-cost eﬀect. The point estimates are negative, even when
paying something is compared to paying nothing.
Finally, Hidalgo et al. (2013) report about an experiment where free school
uniforms were provided to primary school children in deprived areas in Ecuador.
To minimize selection eﬀects, the provision of free uniforms to treatment schools
was not publicly announced and the analysis focuses on students in the last two
years of primary school. This study finds a significantly negative eﬀect of free
provision of uniforms on school attendance measured during three unannounced
visits, which is consistent with the sunk-cost eﬀect.
There are important diﬀerences between the studies of Ashraf et al. (2010) and
Cohen and Dupas (2010), and those of Hidalgo et al. (2013) and ourselves. The
first diﬀerence is that the discounts oﬀered are far smaller in the first two studies,
also compared to the participants’ earnings. A larger discount should increase
the chance of finding a sunk-cost eﬀect, which could explain why Ashraf et al.
(2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010) do not find a sunk-cost eﬀect and Hidalgo
et al. (2013) do (cf. Garland and Newport, 1991; Rodrik, 2009). However, as a
percentage of the total costs of education the discount is small in Hidalgo et al.
(2013) and our study, especially if opportunity costs such as forgone income are
included. The second diﬀerence is the type of product, health versus education.
It may be that when health is concerned people are less likely to make explicit
cost-benefit comparisons, but it is not clear what that means for the sunk-cost
bias. On the one hand explicit comparisons may lead to more rational decisions
and therefore reduce the bias, on the other hand explicit comparisons make the
(2006) show that higher entry fees facilitate cooperation and Meyer (1993) that higher entree
fees increase bids in an auction.
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cost more salient which could increase the bias.
The health and education products that we compare here, also diﬀer in the
opportunity costs involved in using them. While water purification bottles and
bed nets may have alternative usages, these are quite limited for education. In
contrast attending school or university involves the use of time which may have
a high opportunity cost. This is also the case in Thaler’s (1980) classic examples
of driving 60 miles in a snowstorm to a basketball game, and continuing playing
tennis with an injury.
It is not a priori clear whether the context of our experiment makes it more
or less likely to find evidence for sunk-cost eﬀects than in the other studies. The
participants in our study are drawn from a population of university students and,
therefore, they are probably more rational than the participants in the studies of
Ashraf et al. (2010), Cohen and Dupas (2010) and Hidalgo et al. (2013) who come
from poor families in developing countries. At the same time, the participants in
these studies probably all had previous experiences with buying and using water
purification bottles, mosquito bed nets and school uniforms. This is likely to
improve the quality of the decision under study. In contrast, a majority of the
students in our sample have no previous experience with extra-curricular courses.
The main result of this chapter is that we do not find a significant eﬀect of
sunk costs on attendance or performance when we study the full sample. To
inquire whether the absence of sunk-cost eﬀects is due to income eﬀects, we have
estimated whether there are diﬀerential eﬀects for students with above and below
median monthly income, and for students who paid themselves for the course
or whose parents paid. Diﬀerences between these groups turn out to be minor,
indicating that income eﬀects do not explain our main result. Following Ashraf
et al. (2010) we have also looked at the subsample of students who on the basis
of hypothetical survey questions can be categorized as sunk-cost prone. For this
subsample we find a significant sunk-cost eﬀect on attendance: sunk-cost prone
students who receive a larger discount are less likely to attend. We acknowledge,
however, that the measurement of sunk-cost proneness has some caveats.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows, Section 3.2 describes
the setting of our study, the experimental design and the data. Section 3.3 briefly
discusses our empirical approach. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results.
Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 Design and data
3.2.1 Setting
Our field experiment concerns students participating in extra-curricular tutorial
sessions for various courses at four Dutch universities. These sessions are oﬀered
by De Bijlespartner, a company organizing additional tutorial sessions for stu-
dents in cooperation with several local study associations. This company provides
study materials and recruits more senior students, who performed well on the sub-
ject, as teachers. Each tutorial group contains between eight and 13 students.
Tutorial sessions are connected to a course oﬀered in the regular curriculum and
these sessions run concurrently with that course. Courses at Dutch universities
typically last seven or eight weeks, the tutorial sessions take place during the final
four or five weeks.9 Each week there is one tutorial session of two or three hours.
Students register online through their study association’s website for the tutorial
sessions. At the start of the first session, participants pay for the full set of four
or five sessions. The listed price for a set of tutorial sessions varies somewhat
between courses and is either €60, €65 or €75. The prices are not aﬀected by
our experiment; the company oﬀers similar tutorials for the same prices in other
periods during the academic year.
The experiment involved five study programs at four Dutch universities: busi-
ness administration and psychology at the VU University Amsterdam, economics
and business at the University of Amsterdam, social sciences at Utrecht Univer-
sity, and psychology at the University of Groningen. For each study program
we carried out the experiment only during one block of courses to prevent that
students would expect to get a discount. In total, we included tutorial sessions
for 14 courses in our experiment. All courses are oﬀered under the name of the
student association of the study program (not under the name of the company)
which ensures that students would not expect a discount when hearing about dis-
counts in other study programs. The courses for which the tutorial sessions are
oﬀered are mainly statistics or math courses because students find these courses
particularly diﬃcult. Table 3.i in Appendix A lists for each study program the
courses for which tutorial sessions were oﬀered, the full price, and the numbers
of groups and participating students.
9 The tutorial sessions start later than the course so that students can decide in the first weeks
whether or not to take the additional tutorial sessions.
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3.2.2 Experimental design
The goal of our field experiment is to study whether education subsidies aﬀect
study eﬀort and performance net of their impact through the enrollment decision.
In particular, we test for the presence of a sunk-cost eﬀect. To generate variation
in tuition fees independent of students’ willingness to pay, we randomly gave an
unexpected discount to students who already signed up and were ready to pay the
full tuition fee. We introduced four possible discounts: a full discount (treatment
Free), a discount of the full price minus €10 (treatment Large Discount; LD), a
discount of €10 (treatment Small Discount; SD) and no discount (treatment Full
Price). All students have an equal ex ante probability to receive each discount
level.
For the experiment we took control of the payment process for the tutorial ses-
sions. When students registered for a set of tutorial sessions, they were informed
that they had to pay in cash at the start of the first session. When students
arrived we invited them to participate in a study on study behavior and informed
them that they could get a discount. Students were not informed about the goal
of our study and were not told why randomly diﬀerent discounts were oﬀered.10
Upon agreeing to participate students completed a questionnaire in which they
also gave permission to use their information for this study.11 The questionnaire
asked, among other things, about study habits, maximum willingness to pay and
how much they thought the tutorial would help them to pass the relevant exam.
After completing the questionnaire students entered a classroom one at a time
to determine their discount and pay the remaining tuition fee. They were told that
they had an equal chance to receive any of the four possible discounts, and that
the discount would be determined by choosing a closed envelope. Before arrival of
the students we prepared the envelopes with discount tickets, including an equal
number of envelopes for each discount. When a student picked an envelope, this
envelope was not replaced. The number of envelopes was such that the final
student could choose from at least four envelopes. We chose this procedure to
make it very clear to participants that the discount is randomly determined and
unrelated to the quality of the tutorial sessions. This avoids that students infer
something about the quality of the course from the transaction price they paid.
We asked students not to reveal their discount when leaving the room to prevent
10Giving random discounts is comparable to the procedure marketing firms frequently use when
they reward respondents to a questionnaire by giving them the chance to win a valuable item
instead of paying all respondents a small amount. It is therefore unlikely that participants
will infer that they are part of a randomized experiment.
11Only two out of 373 students refused to participate and they paid the full price. Students
who did not show up for the first session or registered for the tutorial session after the oﬃcial
deadline were not allowed to participate in our experiment.
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students who had not paid yet from updating probabilities for specific discounts.
During the course the teachers recorded students’ attendance at each session
and reported this to us after the course. During the final tutorial session students
filled out the usual evaluation form to which we added some questions. These
questions included a control question to check whether students remembered their
discount, their opinion about the discount and hypothetical sunk-cost questions.
If students were not present at the final session we contacted them to complete
the evaluation form either through email or over the phone.12 The response rate is
94%. The results in table 3.ii in the appendix show that response is slightly higher
in the group that received the large discount than in the group that received the
full price treatment, and that students in the free treatment are more likely than
students in the full price treatment to have responded through email. Since the
share that responds through email is rather small (0.04), this diﬀerence involves
only few students.13 Finally, from the university administrations we received
grades for the exams of the regular course connected to the tutorial sessions.
A possible contaminator to the sunk-cost eﬀect is an income eﬀect operating in
the opposite direction. We asked students whether they paid for the tutorial ses-
sions themselves or whether they received extra money from others, for example,
their parents. We also asked students about their monthly income. The income
eﬀect may be less important for students whose parents pay for the course and
for students with a relatively high income. We discuss findings for these groups
in subsection 3.4.2.
Following Ashraf et al. (2010) we included hypothetical sunk-cost questions in
the post-treatment survey, which allows us to identify sunk-cost-prone people. We
asked participants “suppose you bought a bottle of juice for €2. When you start
to drink it, you realize you don’t really like the taste. Would you finish drinking
it?” Next, we asked two follow-up questions, for €5 and €1, “Now suppose you
bought exactly the same bottle of juice for €.. . Would you finish drinking it?”.
A participant is categorized as sunk-cost prone if s/he always finishes the bottle,
or finishes the bottle when a high price has been paid and doesn’t finish the bottle
when a lower price has been paid.
One could argue that asking participants the hypothetical sunk-cost questions
in the post-treatment questionnaire may lead to respondents to try to rationalize
their behavior. However, the question was about juice, so students had to make
the link from buying juice to paying for tutorial sessions. Next, it requires that
12In total 70 students were not present during the last session. Of these students 14 answered
the questionnaire by mail, 38 over the phone and 18 did not answer the questionnaire at all.
13Eight students in the free treatment answered through email. In the other groups these
numbers are zero (large discount), three (small discount) and three (full price).
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students know how often they would have attended class when given another
discount. Moreover, asking these questions in the pre-treatment survey is less
attractive because it might make the purpose of the experiment explicit. We
elaborate further on this issue in subsection 3.4.3.
3.2.3 Data
In total, 371 students registered before the oﬃcial deadline and showed up for
the first meeting. Some students took two or three diﬀerent tutorial courses at
the same time and could get a discount at each occasion. The sample of 371
observations consists of 340 unique students, participating in 14 diﬀerent courses
and 39 diﬀerent tutorial groups. Randomization of the discounts took place within
each tutorial group. We want to restrict the sample to full-time students.14 Since
there is no direct indicator in the data for full-time students, we drop students
who are older than 26 or earn more than €1200 a month as they are more likely to
be part-time students.15 We also exclude two students without exam information.
The final sample contains 339 observations (312 unique students).
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample and for each treat-
ment group separately. The last column presents p-values of a Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test, which tests whether at least two of the four
treatment groups diﬀer significantly from each other. Due to the 6% non-response
on the post-treatment survey and some item non-response, the numbers of obser-
vations vary somewhat between variables. Observations are fairly equally divided
over the treatment groups. Furthermore, the characteristics seem to be well bal-
anced over treatment groups: only one out of 16 reported p-values is smaller than
0.10. Around 60% of the participants are female and the average age is 21.1 years.
The mean monthly income is about €570, and it is a bit higher in the groups
with a lower discount. About 60% of the participants are economics students. On
average, in the pre-treatment survey students report that they devote 27 hours
per week to studying and expect to spend slightly over 13 hours to the subject
connected to the tutorial sessions. Over 30% of the students already made at
least one attempt to pass the course. Students reported that they are willing to
pay, on average, 12% more for the tutorial sessions than the full price and believe
that participation in the sessions raises the likelihood to pass the exam by, on
average, 28 percentage points. Almost half of the participants report that they
14For part-time students the discount is smaller relative to their income, it can be that their
employer pays for the tutorial sessions or grades might matter for their employer. Therefore,
one should expect a smaller sunk-cost eﬀect for part-time students.
15When these students are included, the estimates become a bit smaller but the signs and
significance levels are the same.
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received extra money from their parents to participate in the tutorial sessions.
The actual number of hours that students spent on the subject, reported in the
post-treatment questionnaire, is 10.8 hours per week. Finally, 45% of the stu-
dents should be considered sunk-cost prone according to the hypothetical-choice
questions in the questionnaire.
3.3 Empirical strategy
This section briefly describes our empirical approach. For each outcome (atten-
dance and performance), we present results from the following five regressions:
Yic = ↵1 +  1Freei + ⌘1LDi + ✓1SDi +  1Xi + µ1c + ✏1ic (3.1)
Yic = ↵2 +  2Freei +  2Xi + µ2c + ✏2ic (3.2)
Yic = ↵3 +  3(Freei + LDi) +  3Xi + µ3c + ✏3ic (3.3)
Yic = ↵4 +  4(Freei + LDi + SDi) +  4Xi + µ4c + ✏4ic (3.4)
Yic = ↵5 +  5Discounti +  5Xi + µ5c + ✏5ic (3.5)
where Yic is the outcome variable for student i in course c; Freei, LDi and SDi are
indicators for the diﬀerent treatment groups; Discounti is a continuous measure
for the discount; Xi is a vector of control variables; and the µc’s are course fixed
eﬀects. The  ’s, ⌘1 and ✓1 are the parameters of interest.
Equation (3.1) includes separate dummies for the three diﬀerent discount
levels. This tests for each discount level separately whether it has an impact
compared to the “full price”. Equation (3.2) only includes a dummy for the “free”
treatment, and, therefore, compares paying nothing to paying something (large
discount, small discount and full price jointly). This specification tests whether
paying matters.16 Equation (3.3) includes a dummy which equals one for the
“free” treatment and the “large discount” treatment, and, therefore, compares
these treatments jointly to the other two treatments (small discount and full
price) jointly. This specification tests whether paying (almost) nothing has a
diﬀerent impact than paying (almost) the full price and therefore compares two
groups of participants with a large price diﬀerence between the groups and a
small price diﬀerence within the groups. Equation (3.4) includes a dummy which
is one if any discount is given and thus compares getting a discount versus paying
16This specific hypothesis was suggested to Ashraf et al. (2010) by NGO personnel regarding
the use of Clorin. They find estimates that are large and positive, but not significant. From
which they conclude that “while our data show no evidence of an eﬀect of an act of paying,
they are at least consistent with such an eﬀect, suggesting the need for further research.”
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Treatment
obs All Free LD SD Full p-val
Pre-treatment survey
Female 339 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.62 0.87
Age 338 21.1 20.8 21.5 21.0 21.3 0.23
Monthly income (in €) 335 567 532 528 573 631 0.05
Economics or Business student 339 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.62 0.55 0.76
Time spend on study (per week) 338 27.0 26.9 27.5 27.2 26.4 0.87
Time spend on subject (predicted) 337 13.3 14.5 12.5 12.7 13.3 0.79
First attempt for exam 337 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.63
Max willingness to pay (frac. of pr.) 333 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.13 0.55
Predicted prob. passing no tutorial 338 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.14
Predicted prob. passing with tutorial 338 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.12
Course payed by parents 339 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.54 0.45 0.63
Post-treatment survey
Sunk-costs prone 306 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.86
Quality of the course (scale 1-10) 319 7.19 7.26 7.45 7.04 7.04 0.46
Hours spent on subject per week 317 10.8 11.1 10.9 10.5 10.8 0.74
Subjective prob. of passing exam 316 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.71
=1 of controls missing 339 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.98
Total number of observations 339 86 79 87 87
Note: The final column present the p-value of a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank
test.
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the full price. Finally, equation (3.5) includes the size of the discount as fraction
of the full price as the treatment variable.17
For all five equations we present results from specifications with and with-
out control variables. The control variables are gender, age, income, maximum
willingness to pay, whether the course is paid by someone else, average study
time, whether it is the first attempt for the exam, and the estimated probabil-
ity to pass the exam without tutorial. All control variables are measured before
the randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the 39 tutorial
groups.
We also present results from specifications where the treatment variables are
interacted with student characteristics. The first student characteristic for which
we investigate interaction eﬀects is the sunk-cost-prone indicator. This allows us
to examine whether the hypothetical sunk-cost questions help to identify students
who respond (stronger) to discounts. The two other student characteristics that
we interact with the treatment variables are: i) an indicator for the course being
paid by someone else and ii) an indicator for the student having income above
the median. With these two variables we assess the relevance of income eﬀects.
3.4 Results
We present the empirical results in three subsections. In subsection 3.4.1 we
present estimates of the impact of the treatments on attendance and perfor-
mance. Next, asses the importance of income eﬀects and we look at heteroge-
neous treatment eﬀects for sunk-cost prone students in subsection 3.4.2. Finally,
in subsection 3.4.3 we characterize the sunk-cost prone students.
3.4.1 Treatment eﬀects on attendance and performance
Table 3.2 presents estimation results for two measures of attendance as outcome
variables: i) being always present at the tutorial sessions, and ii) the fraction of
sessions attended. Columns (1) and (3) present eﬀects without the inclusion of
control variables; columns (2) and (4) include control variables.
The overall pattern for the full sample is somewhat erratic. The results from
equation (1) suggest that students who received the free treatment are present
less often than students who paid the full price. At the same time, students
who received the large discount are present more often and are more likely to
17Note that equations (3.2) to (3.5) are restricted versions of equation (3.1). The respective
restrictions are: (i) ⌘1 = ✓1 = 0; (ii)  1 = ⌘1; ✓1 = 0; (iii)  1 = ⌘1 = ✓1; (iv)  1, ⌘1 and ✓1 are
proportionate to the discounts. Recall that the full price diﬀers somewhat between courses.
Therefore, the large and small discount are a slightly diﬀerent fraction of the full price.
57
Table 3.2: Eﬀects of treatments on attendance
Eq Variable Always present Fraction present
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Free -0.06 (0.06) -0.11 (0.07) -0.03 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03)
LD 0.13 (0.07)* 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.03)* 0.03 (0.03)
SD 0.03 (0.07) -0.04 (0.08) 0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04)
(2) Free -0.11 (0.05)** -0.12 (0.05)** -0.05 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.03)**
(3) Free | LD 0.02 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
(4) Free | LD | SD 0.03 (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
(5) Discount 0.00 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Mean dependent var. . . . .
full price treatment 0.69 0.69 0.86 0.86
Control variables no yes no yes
Observations 327 327 327 327
Note: Regressions in the even-numbered columns include controls for gender, age, income, maximum willingness
to pay, course paid by someone else, average study time, first attempt for exam and the estimated probability to
pass the exam without tutorial. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly diﬀerent from
zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Furthermore, course fixed eﬀects are included and standard errors are clustered
by tutorial group.
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be always present than students who paid the full price. These findings are
somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of control variables. This non-monotone
pattern is neither consistent with a sunk-cost eﬀect nor with an income eﬀect.
The results from equation (2) show that students in the free treatment are less
likely to be always present and are present less often than students from the
three other treatments together. These results disappear when the students who
received the large discount are added to those who received the free treatment
(equation (3)). This indicates that the main diﬀerence in attendance is between
the students in the free treatment and in the large discount treatment. These
results do not provide evidence in support of a sunk-cost eﬀect in the full sample
on being always present or attendance rates.
Several studies find that people respond to financial incentives during the so-
called hot decision stage shortly after the announcement of a payment scheme,
but not anymore during the cold decision stage (cf. Gneezy and List, 2006; Leu-
ven et al., 2011). Such a pattern is also present in the study of Arkes and Blumer
(1985), who find that the sunk-cost eﬀect is driven by behavior in the first half
of the theater season. To inquire the relevance of the hot decision stage in our
experiment, we look at the impact of the diﬀerent treatments on students’ atten-
dance of separate session distinguished by second session, third and last (fourth
or fifth).18 Because students could only participate in the experiment if they
attended the first session, there is no variation in the attendance of that session.
The first three columns of table 3.3 report the results.19 These show no support
for a short-lived sunk-cost eﬀect. Although the estimated eﬀects of the free treat-
ment on attending the second tutorial session are significantly negative, they are
not diﬀerent from the estimated eﬀects of this treatment on attending subsequent
sessions (compare the coeﬃcients from the second equation for diﬀerent sessions).
Columns (4) to (6) of table 3.3 report estimates of the eﬀects of the diﬀer-
ent treatments on exam performance (passing and grade) and hours spent on
the subject of related to the tutorial course (as reported by the students in the
post-treatment questionnaire). Students only have an outcome for grade if they
attended the exam. Results in columns (4) and (5) show that students who re-
ceived the free treatment or the large discount treatment have a higher pass rate
than students assigned to the other two treatments. This eﬀect is mainly caused
by the high pass rate of the students who received the large discount. This is
also the group with the highest attendance rate of the exam. If we only com-
18One course (11 students) had only three meetings. Attendance of the third meeting of that
course is included in the analysis of the third meeting as well as in the analysis of the last
meeting.
19Table 3.iii in Appendix B reports all the results from table 3.3 from specifications without
covariates.
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pare treatment free to treatment large discount, there is a significant diﬀerence
in attendance (always present; p=0.02), but not in pass rates (p=0.86). We find
no significant treatment eﬀects for the other outcome variables, grades and the
number of hours spent on the subject.20
3.4.2 Heterogeneity
In this subsection we inquire whether treatment eﬀects diﬀer across subgroups.
First, we focus on students who report that they (would have) paid the tuition
fee for the tutorial course themselves. So, they did not receive extra money from
their parents to pay for the course. In addition, we inquire whether eﬀects are
diﬀerent for students with above and below median incomes. Next, following
Ashraf et al. (2010), we single out students who are sunk-cost prone on the basis
of hypothetical survey questions.
Income eﬀects. A discount on the full price may in principle aﬀect attendance
through an income eﬀect. Students who pay the full price for the course have
less wealth and may, therefore, decide to work more, perhaps at the expense of
lower attendance of the course. This mechanism works in the opposite direction
of the sunk-cost eﬀect and may thus possibly explain why we find no support for
a sunk-cost eﬀect in the full sample.
To examine this possibility we estimated treatment eﬀects for students who
are less likely to be aﬀected by an income eﬀect. We define such students in two
ways. First, as students who did not pay for the course themselves but whose
parents paid for the course. We asked students whether they paid for the tutorial
course from their regular income or whether they received extra money to pay for
the tutorial course from their parents.21 Second, we take students with monthly
income above the median monthly income in our sample (Ashraf et al., 2010 use
the same approach). The second test is probably more convincing than the first
because not paying for the course yourself may mitigate the sunk-cost eﬀect at
the same time.
We re-estimated our models including interaction terms of treatment dummies
with indicators for paying parents and above median income, respectively. Table
20The data only show a weak positive correlation between the grade and number of hours spent
on the course (0.04) and fraction of tutorial sessions attended (0.06). Furthermore, fraction
of tutorial sessions attended is negatively correlated to number of hours spent on the course
(-0.16) which suggests some substitution of eﬀort.
21We phrase the question like this since most students in the Netherlands receive some study
allowance from their parents. We believe the relevant margin is whether students receive
extra money, earmarked for the tutoring course. Paying the course from the general study
allowance implies a reduction of their disposable income whereas receiving extra money for
the course does not.
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3.4 reports the results. If income eﬀects hide the presence of a sunk-cost eﬀect
in the full sample, we expect to find negative treatment eﬀects for students who
did not pay themselves and for students with income above the median. We
find no evidence that income eﬀects hide a sunk-cost eﬀect. In fact we find
significantly lower attendance when assigned to the free treatment for students
who paid themselves, but not for students whose parents paid, the opposite of the
hypothesized income eﬀect. This result is in line with the hypothesis that a sunk-
cost eﬀect is less likely for students whose parents paid because these students
are not aﬀected by the cost of the course, regardless of the treatment.22 Table 3.5
presents the results on study performance for the two subgroups. Only for the
outcome variable passed there is some indication of an income eﬀect: students
who did not pay themselves and students with income above the median are
somewhat more likely to pass the exam when they receive a discount. This eﬀect
is mainly driven by the students that received a large discount.
Sunk-cost prone. To examine whether the treatment eﬀects vary with re-
spondents’ sunk-cost proneness, we present results where we have interacted the
treatment variables with the indicator for sunk-cost-prone students. Tables 3.6
to 3.8 show the estimates of the treatment eﬀects of the sunk-cost-prone and the
not sunk-cost-prone students.23 The eﬀects of the discounts on the attendance of
sunk-cost-prone students provide support for the hypothesis that these students
attend the tutorial sessions less often and are less likely to be always present when
they receive a (large) discount on the tuition fee. The results from equation (1)
show that sunk-cost-prone students are 28 percentage points less likely to attend
all sessions when they receive the free treatment compared to paying the full price
(column 1a). The fraction of tutorial sessions that they attend is also 11 percent-
age points lower than that of the sunk-cost-prone students who paid the full price
(column 2a). The eﬀects on attendance of receiving the large discount or receiv-
ing the small discount are also negative for sunk-cost-prone students, although
these are not statistically significant. In the other equations the estimated eﬀects
22Next to income eﬀects, another potential contaminating factor is that students may perceive
a lower price as a signal of lower quality. We believe that the procedure of letting students
draw a closed envelope guarantees that students will think that the quality of the course is
unrelated to the transaction price they paid. Consistent with this we find no impact of the
treatment indicators on students’ appreciation of the courses (results not reported). Ashraf
et al. (2010) conduct a similar test when they use information from their follow-up survey
about respondents’ perception of product quality (p.2402).
23Because sunk-cost proneness is only known for respondents of the post-experiment question-
naire, the number of observations in this analysis is smaller than the number of observations
in the previous subsection. The smallest cell contains 29 observations (sunk-cost-prone stu-
dents in the full price treatment). We re-estimated the eﬀects on attendance of table 3.2 for
the restricted sample to make sure that the diﬀerent samples are not causing our results; see
Table 3.iv in Appendix B.
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of the treatment for sunk-cost-prone students in columns 1a and 2a, are (with
one exception) all significantly negative, implying that students who received a
(larger) discount attended fewer tutorial sessions.24
To inquire whether the sunk-cost eﬀect for sunk-cost-prone students is driven
by the hot decision stage, table 3.7 looks at students’ attendance in each separate
tutorial meeting. For sunk-cost-prone students the eﬀect on attendance is not yet
present in the second session. It becomes negative but not significantly so for the
third session, and for the last session it is negative and significant. The sunk-cost
eﬀect for sunk-cost-prone students is thus not due to the hot decision stage.
For non-sunk-cost-prone students most estimates in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are
positive. For attendance of the last meeting, some of the estimates are even
statistically significant. Non-sunk-cost-prone students are more likely to attend
the last meeting if they received a larger discount. This result is largely driven
by students who received the large discount, they respond stronger than students
who did not have to pay. While these results are somewhat puzzling, they do not
aﬀect the finding that the behavior of sunk-cost-prone students is in agreement
with a sunk-cost eﬀect.
Table 3.8 reports the eﬀects on performance and hours for sunk-cost-prone
students. Based on the results on attendance we might have expected that sunk-
cost-prone students perform worse when receiving a larger discount. This is not
what we find: their lower attendance does not translate into weaker performance.
This is probably due to the fact that the impact of the discounts on attendance
is not large enough. It may also be that the eﬀect of attendance on exam per-
formance is not so strong. Finally, there might be counteracting eﬀects, such
as a reduction in the number of hours spent on the course, that might oﬀset
any positive eﬀects on performance. The last column of the table , therefore,
reports the eﬀect of the treatment on the number of hours that students spent
on the course (self-reported). Since hours spent on the course includes the time
in tutorial sessions there may be some oﬀsetting eﬀects.
3.4.3 Characterizing sunk-cost-prone students
From the previous analysis we can conclude that only sunk-cost-prone students
appear to respond to the discounts. In this subsection we, therefore, characterize
sunk-cost-prone students by regressing the indicator for being sunk-cost prone on
a number of observed characteristics. Next, we discuss the caveats of identifying
sunk-cost-prone students in our setting. Table 3.9 shows the results from these
24Column 3 shows results from a regression of sunk-cost proneness on treatment variables and
control variables. We return to these results in the next subsection.
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regressions. Economics and business students are less likely to be sunk-cost prone.
This is also true for students who have a high willingness to pay for the tutorial
course. Otherwise the results show that the sunk-cost-prone indicator is only
weakly correlated with the student characteristics that we observe.
We follow Ashraf et al. (2010) by using hypothetical survey questions to deter-
mine the sunk-cost proneness of an individual. We asked these questions in the
post-treatment survey because asking them in the pre-treatment survey might
make the purpose of the experiment explicit. Another reason is that Ashraf et al.
also asked the hypothetical sunk-cost questions after the experiment ended. By
following their example we avoid that possible diﬀerences in findings can be at-
tributed to the moment when information was collected. A disadvantage of this
procedure is that the construction of subgroups is based on a characteristic which
is potentially aﬀected by the treatments. Table 2.2 shows, however, that there
are no significant diﬀerences in sunk-cost-proneness between the diﬀerent treat-
ment groups, although those in the free treatment are 8% points more likely to
be categorized as sunk-cost prone than those in the Full price treatment. The
final column in table 3.6 shows that the diﬀerences in sunk-cost proneness be-
tween treatment groups become (substantially) smaller, and remain statistically
insignificant, when (pre-treatment) control variables are included.
Another possible worry with the sunk-cost-proneness indicator might be that
students that did not attend the last class did not fill out the survey at that time.
These students either sent us the questionnaire by email or we administered the
questionnaire by phone. Students that answered the survey by email or phone
might be more likely to give responses that identify them as sunk-cost-prone, in
order to rationalize their behavior (not going to the last class). Therefore, we
also include a variable that indicates whether the questionnaire was administered
by email or phone. In columns 3 and 4 of table 3.9 we see that students that
answered the questionnaire by email or phone are not more likely to be sunk-
cost-prone. The coeﬃcients are negative and not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
The negative sign is the reverse of what one would expect if people who answer
by email or phone try to rationalize why they did not attend the last session.
Nonetheless, we can not exclude that the findings for sunk-cost-prone students
are due to reverse causation in which treatment assignment and attendance jointly
influence their sunk-cost-prone status. This would be the case if those who did
not attend the final class in the free treatment are more likely than those who did
not attend the final class in the full price treatment to rationalize their behavior
ex post by responding to the survey in ways that would identify them as sunk-
cost-prone.25
25We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Table 3.9: Characterizing sunk-cost-prone students
Variable Sunk-cost prone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.06 (0.06) -0.00 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07)
Age -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Monthly income (in €) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Econ or Business student -0.15 (0.07)** -0.21 (0.07)**
Time spend on study 0.00 (0.00)
First attempt for exam -0.06 (0.07)
Max willingness to pay -0.25 (0.08)**
Pred. prob. pass w/o tutorial -0.17 (0.17)
Course paid by parents 0.01 (0.06)
Questionnaire by email -0.09 (0.09) -0.07 (0.08)
Questionnaire by phone -0.16 (0.13) -0.23 (0.14)
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07
Observations 295 295 295 295
Note: This table reports results from OLS regressions of the sunk-cost-prone indicator on students background
characteristics. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly diﬀerent from zero at 1%,
5% and 10% level.
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3.5 Conclusion
In his often-cited paper, Thaler (1980) argues that he does not believe that con-
sumers ignore sunk costs in their every day decisions. He refers to some survey
questions in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to examples in which governments
fail to ignore sunk costs, and to introspection to convince the reader. Yet, he
acknowledges that gathering evidence to test the sunk-cost hypothesis is compli-
cated due to selection bias. The recent studies by Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen
and Dupas (2010) report about field experiments which have been designed to
take selection issues into account. Both studies fail to find significant sunk-cost
eﬀects.
Our field experiment is comparable to those of Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen
and Dupas (2010), but we believe two features of our design give the sunk-cost
hypothesis a better chance than their designs. First, we oﬀer substantially larger
discounts than the previous authors, which should increase the chance of finding a
sunk-cost eﬀect (cf. Garland and Newport, 1991; Rodrik, 2009). Second, the pre-
vious studies look at products where the opportunity costs of actually using them
appear much smaller than in the case of attending sessions of an extra-curricular
course. The opportunity costs of actual usage seems an essential element of the
sunk-cost examples provided by Thaler.
Despite our eﬀorts to stack the deck in favor of finding sunk-cost eﬀects, we
find no evidence of such eﬀects for our full sample. Discounts on tuition fees have,
on average, no impact on class attendance in our sample of students who signed up
for extra-curricular courses. We inquired whether the absence of sunk-cost eﬀects
can be attributed to income eﬀects, but find no evidence of that. Finally, we
followed Ashraf et al. (2010) who used hypothetical survey questions to single out
individuals with a proneness to take sunk costs into account. For this subsample
we find a significant sunk-cost eﬀect on attendance: sunk-cost prone students
who receive a larger discount are less likely to attend. This does, however, not
translate into better performance for these students. We acknowledge, however,
that the measurement of sunk-cost proneness has some caveats.
While we believe that the size of the discounts and the context of our experi-
ment gave the sunk-cost hypothesis a better chance than previous studies, it may
of course be the case that we did not go far enough. It may be that with larger
discounts and/or higher opportunity costs of actual usage, a larger share of the
sample does not ignore sunk costs.
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3.A Courses
Table 3.i: Courses oﬀered at universities
Study program Full price # #
(in €) groups students
VU University Amsterdam (VU)
Business Mathematics Econ & Business 75 3 34
Financial Accounting and Bookkeeping Econ & Business 75 2 17
Quantitative Business Analysis Econ & Business 75 1 10
Statistics I (premaster) Econ & Business 75 2 21
Statistics II (premaster) Econ & Business 75 5 57
Mathematics (premaster) Econ & Business 75 3 35
Statistics II Psychology 60 2 16
Meten en Diagnostiek II Psychology 60 2 13
Utrecht University (UU)
Methodology and Statistics I Social Sciences 65 4 34
Methodology and Statistics (premaster) Social Sciences 65 1 10
University of Amsterdam (UvA)
Econometrics Econ & Business 75 2 18
Mathematics and Statistics I Econ & Business 75 4 35
University of Groningen (RUG)
Statistics I A (Dutch) Psychology 65 3 27
Statistics I A (English) Psychology 65 3 23
Statistics II part II Psychology 65 2 21
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3.B Additional tables
Table 3.ii: Eﬀects of treatments on response and method of response
Eq Variable Survey Questionnaire Questionnaire
response by email by phone
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Free 0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.06)
LD 0.08 (0.03)** -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.05)
SD 0.04 (0.04) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.06)
(2) Free -0.03 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03)* -0.02 (0.05)
(3) Free | LD 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
(4) Free | LD | SD 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05)
(5) Discount 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.04)
Mean dependent variable
full price treatment 0.90 0.04 0.16
Control variables yes yes yes
Observations 327 295 295
Note: All regressions include controls for gender, age, income, maximum willingness to pay, course paid by
someone else, average study time, first attempt for exam and the estimated probability to pass the exam
without tutorial. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly diﬀerent from zero at 1%,
5% and 10% level. Furthermore, course fixed eﬀects are included and standard errors are clustered by tutorial
group.
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4
Job Search Periods for
Welfare Applicants:
Evidence from a Social
Experiment1
4.1 Introduction
Many countries have some welfare system which provides benefits to low income
families. Welfare then acts as a safety net guaranteeing a minimum level of income
to inhabitants. In the United States, welfare is mostly used to support single par-
ents households. In European countries, it also supports long-term unemployed
workers, who are no longer entitled to social insurance benefits. Whereas welfare
aims at families with a low capability of generating suﬃcient income, governments
often do not have perfect information about the income-generating capacity of
a given individual. This may induce moral hazard causing excess spendings on
welfare benefits payments. Among policy makers there is a tendency to restrict
access to benefit schemes and to be more strict on job search requirements. Causal
evidence on the eﬀect on take up of more stringent entry requirements is, however,
scarce (Currie, 2006).
This chapter evaluates mandatory job search periods for welfare applicants.
During this four-week period the first payment of benefits is postponed, and appli-
cants are supposed to very actively search for work. The application for welfare
benefits will only be activated if the applicant returns to the agency after the
search period. However, the amount of benefits than an individual is entitled to
does not change. To evaluate such search periods we ran a field experiment run-
1 This chapter is based on Bolhaar et al. (2015)
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ning from April 2012 to March 2013, incorporating the full population of welfare
applicants with potential to work in the city of Amsterdam. We construct a very
detailed administrative dataset covering the participants in the experiment. As
such we can not only look at the implications of a search period on the likelihood
to receive welfare benefits but we can also determine the alternative source of in-
come that these individuals have. In addition, we can establish whether a search
period increases the likelihood to relocate and to engage in criminal activities.
A search period can aﬀect labor market outcomes in several ways. First, the
job search requirement can increase the likelihood to find a job and thereby de-
crease the likelihood to receive welfare benefits. Second, a search period makes
the application process for welfare benefits more complex and increases the trans-
action costs of applying. Applicants have to pay a second visit to the welfare oﬃce
and reactivate their application in order to receive benefits. This can decrease the
likelihood to receive benefits even in absence of an eﬀect on the job finding rate.
Both mechanisms can serve as a self-selection or self-screening device (Parsons,
1991), but possibly hit a diﬀerent part of the population of applicants. An in-
crease in the job finding rate will reduce take up of applicants with good outside
opportunities while increased complexity could scare away applicants that did
not find a job but are not able to deal with the complexity of the application
process.2
Several studies document a decrease in take up of means-tested welfare ben-
efits as a result of increased transaction or application costs (see among others
Currie and Grogger (2001), Krueger (1990), Bitler et al. (2003) and Brien and
Swann (1999)). These increased application costs include requiring more frequent
visits to the welfare oﬃce, reduced re-certification intervals or requiring exten-
sive income documentation. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) model complexity as
an instrument used by program administrators to extract a better signal of true
eligibility, and argue that the complexity of the application process is a policy in-
strument that is chosen alongside benefit levels and eligibility rules in the design
of a program. In all these cases the question remains whether the (non-financial)
barriers screen out the right people. The mentioned studies report a decrease in
take up, but do not observe the source of income of the non-participants. With-
2 If applicants have time inconsistent preferences and put more weight on the present than
on the future in making decisions this could be a third mechanism (O’Donoghue and Rabin,
1999). Many of the costs of applying for welfare are borne immediately, whereas the benefits
are in the future. Hence, a search period might discourage a person with time-inconsistent
preferences to carry through the application for benefits, even though it would be utility
maximizing to be a beneficiary at some later date. It is however not clear that the two
hypotheses (non participants in social programs are ‘irrational’ in the sense that they have
time-inconsistent preferences or that non-participants just face high costs of enrollment) have
diﬀerent policy implications (Currie, 2006).
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out this information it is diﬃcult to determine whether the right people were
selected out. We exploit the availability of administrative data in the Nether-
lands to follow the participants in the experiment. This allows us to combine the
advantages of two approaches: The field experiment provides a good setting for
causal inference and through the administrative data we have no problems with
attrition or unobserved outcomes.
The job search requirement in the search period relate this chapter to the
literature on the eﬀectiveness of active labor market policies. The majority of
this literature concentrates on programs aimed at recipients of unemployment
benefits, with a relatively short distance to the labor market (for an overview,
see Card et al. (2010)). Welfare recipients are relatively disadvantaged workers
that are at risk of leaving the labor force permanently, so the potential gains of
eﬀective programs for welfare applicants can be large. Furthermore, for credit
constrained welfare applicants small financial incentives might matter a lot. For
example, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2013) find that imposing benefit sanc-
tions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work
and Card and Robins (1998) show that the financial incentives in the Canadian
self-suﬃciency program induced welfare recipients to work more. Randomized
field experiments with welfare applicants are even more scarce. Given the vul-
nerability of the population at hand, authorities are not very likely to agree with
the execution of a field experiment. This is especially the case when evaluating
existing policies (in contrast to the evaluation of additional policies or resources).
In our field experiment we use a so-called encouragement design (Duflo et al.,
2007), in which treatment is encouraged instead of imposed on a randomly se-
lected group of subjects. In our case, treatment is randomized over caseworkers,
that receive the encouragement to apply one particular treatment, a default op-
tion, to all their new clients. In case the default option is really not appropriate,
we allow caseworkers to deviate. This helped to make the experiment more ac-
ceptable for caseworkers and in getting them to commit to the experiment. The
design exploits the random assignment of applicants to caseworkers within lo-
cal welfare oﬃce.3 hinges on the fact that applicants are randomly assigned to
caseworkers. In case of suﬃcient compliance to the default options this enables
us to estimate the causal eﬀect of a search period. Behaghel et al. (2013) also
used an encouragement design to evaluate an active labor-market program in
France. Furthermore, our empirical strategy is similar to Maestas et al. (2013),
who exploit variation in examiners’ allowance rates as an instrument for dis-
3 Wthin local oﬃce all caseworkers have the same target concerning exit to work. The random
assignment of applicants to caseworkers ensures that all caseworkers have the same fair chance
to meet the target. This also allows the welfare agency to benchmark caseworkers.
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ability benefit receipt, using that applicants are randomly assigned to disability
examiners. However, in our experiment compliance is much higher. Through
the encouragement design, we have more variation in application rates, which
increases the power of the design.
To preview our results, we find a strong and persistent negative eﬀect of a
search period on the likelihood to receive benefits: It reduces the likelihood to
receive benefits by 20 percentage points. The eﬀect is significantly negative up to
six months after registration, and during these months welfare benefits payments
are reduced by 25 percent. There is no spillover to other benefit schemes and
the lower income from welfare benefits is fully compensated (112 percent) by
higher earnings. A search period increases the likelihood to relocate to another
municipality, but does not increase the likelihood to engage in criminal activities.
The fact that the reduced income from benefits is fully compensated by higher
earnings suggests that a search period does screen out the right people. Subgroup
analysis confirms this: The eﬀect of a search period increases with education.
For applicants with at least a bachelor degree the likelihood to receive benefits
decreases with 50 percent. We find no evidence of negative side eﬀects of a search
period for the most vulnerable applicants. A search period does lead to a higher
probability to have a very low income, but this eﬀect is mainly driven by highly
educated applicants.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section pro-
vides details about the benefit system in the Netherlands. Section 4.3 explains
the experimental design and provides evidence on compliance rates. In section
4.4 we describe the data used in this chapter and discuss the empirical strategy
and the identification. Section 4.5 presents the main results, while section 4.6
assesses the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects along the dimensions gender, age,
education and position in the earnings distribution. Section 4.7 discusses the gen-
eralizability of our results by interpreting the estimated local average treatment
eﬀect. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Institutional background
In this section, we provide some background information on the welfare system
in the Netherlands. We restrict attention to those elements that are relevant for
our analysis.
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4.2.1 Welfare in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, welfare serves as a safety net and provides households that
have no or not enough means of living with a minimum income level. Welfare
benefits are means tested (on both income and wealth) and the benefit level only
depends on the composition of the household. The benefits range from 802 euro
per month for a single person household to 1336 euro per month for a couple
with children.4 In addition to welfare benefits, households can receive monthly
housing subsidies, health insurance subsidies and child subsidies.5
If a welfare recipient finds part-time employment or has part-time employment
with earnings below the welfare level, earnings have a marginal tax rate of 100
percent. For the health insurance and housing subsidies other marginal tax rates
apply. At the time of our experiment, the net minimum wage was approximately
1200 euro per month in case of full-time employment, such that the replacement
rate for applicants with a low-earnings potential can range from 67 percent to
almost 100 percent (depending on household composition). Unlike in the US,
there is no maximum to the time period that a household can receive welfare
benefits. Welfare recipients have to comply with job-search requirements, and
have to accept all jobs, independent of their education or work experience.6
Welfare is organized at the level of the municipality, and individuals apply
for benefits at the local welfare oﬃce closest to their house. Next, the applicant
will be invited for an intake meeting with a caseworker, during which the rights
and obligations of receiving welfare benefits are explained. Applicants have to
bring extensive proof of their (past) income, bank accounts, housing etc. to
this meeting. Based on this information, supplemented with information from
administrative sources, it will be determined whether an individual is entitled to
benefits. The welfare oﬃce can decide to make a house visit, to assess the claim
that the applicant does not cohabit and does not work.
Rules about eligibility and level of benefits are decided upon at the national
level, but the responsibility for the implementation is at the municipality level.
Municipalities receive a fixed annual budget for managing their welfare system,
of which any unused excess may be kept.7 How welfare recipients are guided to
work and how the number of welfare recipients is kept under control is left to the
4 The exact amounts for 2012 are given in Table 4.i in the Appendix.
5 The maximum monthly amounts of these subsidies are €309 (for housing subsidies), €70
(health insurance subsidies) and per child €84 (child subsidies).
6 A diﬀerent regime applies to recipients of UI benefits, that at the beginning of their UI spell
are allowed to search for jobs that match their education level.
7 For example, in 2012 the municipality of Amsterdam spent 103 percent of its budget for
welfare, which was also the average for all municipalities in the Netherlands).
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municipalities’ discretion. The level of the annual budget is determined with an
allocation model based on average population characteristics of the municipality
such as home ownership, age and education. These characteristics are not likely
to depend on the eﬀectiveness of the municipalities’ labor market policy.
4.3 Experiment
In this section, we first discuss the setting of our experiment, which took place
in Amsterdam. We then describe the intervention, the experimental design and
provide evidence on the random assignment and compliance rates.
4.3.1 Setting of experiment
The sample for the experiment consists of individuals that applied for welfare in
Amsterdam from April 2012 until March 2013. Applicants are classified into four
classes, depending on their relative distance to the labor market. This classifi-
cation determines the type and intensity of guidance given to the applicant and
what is expected of him. The classification is determined through a computerized
program that is filled in by the caseworker during the intake meeting. Determi-
nants of the class include, among others, work history, age, education, language
and computer skills, recent detention and psychological problems. Individuals in
the highest class (class IV) should be able to find employment within six months,
and are the only group with potential to flow out to a regular job. Search periods
can only be applied to this group, so this is the group that we will focus on. In
addition, we focus on individuals that are aged 27 and above, as diﬀerent rules
apply to welfare recipients under 27. These selection criteria apply to approxi-
mately 25 percent of the total inflow. The applicants are divided over five welfare
oﬃces in diﬀerent city districts.
A relatively large share of the population of Amsterdam receive welfare ben-
efits. In January 2012, 6.4 percent (34,550 individuals) of the population aged
between 20 and 65 years received benefits in Amsterdam compared to 3.1 percent
in the Netherlands.8 In 2012, the total inflow into welfare benefits in Amsterdam
consisted of 11,706 individuals while in the same year 8,944 individuals left ben-
efits. Economic circumstances have both a direct and a lagged eﬀect on inflow
into welfare benefits. If unemployment increases it will directly increase the in-
flow into welfare benefits for individuals that have no or limited entitlement to
unemployment benefits. For individuals that can first deplete their unemploy-
ment benefits there will be a lagged eﬀect on inflow into welfare benefits. Figure
8 This information is based on data from CBS Statline, accessed on March 18, 2015.
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4.i in the appendix shows GDP growth for the Netherlands and in- and outflow
into welfare in the city of Amsterdam from 2008 until 2014. At the time of the
experiment, in 2012 and the first half of 2013, the Dutch economy was suﬀering
from a second downturn as a consequence of the financial crisis. The inflow into
benefits steadily increased from 2008 until 2014, and ever since the first quarter
of 2009 the inflow into benefits has been larger than the outflow.
During the experiment we asked caseworkers to fill in a form with information
about each applicant. Table 4.1 gives a description of the population that took
part in the experiment, based on information from these forms. The caseworkers
report that 26 percent of the applicants have a bad financial situation. The appli-
cants are considered relatively independent, which is probably related to the fact
that they are classified as being able to find employment within six months. 24
percent of the applicants apply for benefits directly after losing (self)employment,
while the remainder either depleted their UI benefits or applied for another rea-
son. Other reasons to apply for welfare include exhaustion of savings, divorce,
less hours at an existing job such that the total wage drops below the welfare
level, etc. Finally, 56 percent of the applicants are non-western immigrants and
47 percent of the applicants have received welfare benefits before.
4.3.2 Intervention: Search period
The intervention on which our experiment focuses is the search period, a policy
that was introduced by the welfare agency in 2011. A search period postpones
processing the application for benefits by the welfare oﬃce and can last up to four
weeks, in which the individual has to actively search for employment. In partic-
ular, the application for welfare will only be activated if the applicant returns to
the agency after the search period.9 If the welfare application is reactivated and
processed, the applicant will (retrospectively) receive welfare starting at the date
of the initial registration. A search period thus only delays the first payment of
benefits; it does not reduce the amount of benefits that an individual is entitled
to. Figure 4.1 gives a schematic representation of the application process for wel-
fare in Amsterdam, including the search period. Given that the entitlement to
benefits starts at the day of registration, applicants that find employment during
a search period can file a request for welfare for the period between the date of
registration and the starting date of the new employment. This is quite some
administrative hassle and also not actively promoted by the welfare agency, so
not all individuals that find a job during the search period use this possibility.
9 Irrespective of the search period, the welfare application needs to be processed within eight
weeks after the day of registration.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the target population
Mean
Financial situation
Good 0.26
Average 0.48
Bad 0.26
Estimated level of independence (by the caseworker) of the applicant
Very independent 0.40
Somewhat independent 0.54
Completely not independent 0.06
Estimated time (by the caseworker) till exit to employment
within 1 month 0.13
2nd or 3rd month 0.39
4th or 5th month 0.31
6th month or later 0.17
Reason application for welfare
Lost job 0.16
End self-employment 0.08
End UI benefits 0.34
Other reason 0.42
Other characteristics
Non-western immigrant 0.56
Ever received welfare before start of experiment 0.47
Note: The total sample of the experiment consists of 2788 welfare applications (2640 unique
individuals). The information in the first four panels from this table comes from the forms
that caseworkers filled in for these applicants. The forms were completed for 72 percent of the
sample. The degree of independence indicates whether the applicant is self-reliant and is able to
independently search for work. The information in the lowest panel is for the complete sample
and was derived by linking the experimental sample to the database of Statistics Netherlands.
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Figure 4.1: Welfare application procedure
The decision to apply a search period is made during the intake meeting with
the caseworker and, before the experiment, was left to the caseworkers’ discretion.
However, search periods can only be given to individuals that are classified as
‘able to work’. Furthermore, caseworkers should not apply a search period if
an applicant has severe financial problems or can prove that she has been very
active in applying for jobs. An applicant can not refuse a search period. The
exact message conveyed by the caseworker when applying a search period might
diﬀer per caseworker, but in general they will specify a minimum number of job
applications that the applicant has to do within the search period. In addition,
the caseworker can also stress that during the search period the applicant can
still choose which jobs to apply to. As soon as the applicant starts receiving
welfare benefits it is mandatory to accept any job. For example, the caseworker
can threaten to oﬀer unattractive jobs once the applicant returns from a search
period. If the applicant returns from a search period the caseworker generally
checks whether the applicant has complied with the job search requirements, and
can impose a sanction if this is not the case. This sanction is generally a 30%
reduction in benefits for the duration of one month. In practice, these sanctions
are almost never applied.
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4.3.3 Experimental design
In order to isolate the causal eﬀect of a search period we ran a field experiment
in which we manipulated the assignment of a search period.10 Applicants are not
informed about the fact that the experiment is going on, to prevent that this
knowledge would influence their behavior. Instead of randomizing the treatment
over individuals, we randomized the treatment over caseworkers. Caseworkers
received the instruction to apply one particular treatment to all their new clients.
This particular treatment we call their default option, which makes our design
similar to an encouragement design (Duflo et al., 2007). We instructed casework-
ers to deviate from the default option only in cases where the default option is
really not appropriate. The possibility to deviate in special cases helped to make
the experiment more acceptable for caseworkers and in getting them to commit
to the experiment. Our design hinges on the fact that within local oﬃces ap-
plicants are randomly allocated to caseworkers. The matching of applicants to
caseworkers is an administrative process in which there is no regard for applicant
characteristics. Generally, applicants are matched to the caseworker with the
lowest case load.11 There were three diﬀerent default options:
• Never: never apply a search period
• Always: always apply a search period if the financial situation of the indi-
vidual allows this
• Normal policy: do what you think is most appropriate in this case
In the remainder we will refer to these default options as ‘never’, ‘always’ and
‘normal’. The default option ‘normal’ is included to see what the caseworkers
would do with the applicant in absence of an experiment, which allows us to
study targeting of caseworkers. The experimental period was divided into four
periods, and the default option that a caseworker had to apply to its new incoming
clients changed every three months. This means we can control for business cycle
eﬀects, local labor market (welfare oﬃce) fixed eﬀects and, in case of a suﬃcient
number of applicants per caseworker, caseworker fixed eﬀects. The randomization
of default options over caseworkers took place at the level of the welfare oﬃce.
For the success of the experiment it was crucial that compliance to the de-
fault options was suﬃciently high. Before the start of the experiment we had
10The original research design, including a power analysis, can be found at http://personal.
vu.nl/b.vander.klaauw/OnderzoeksOpzetDWI.pdf (in Dutch).
11The total number of caseworkers in our experiment is 112. In some oﬃces there are special
caseworkers that only do the intakes, while in other oﬃces caseworkers also act as job coun-
selors. The division of caseworkers over the five oﬃces is therefore 10 (Southeast), 10 (North),
19 (Center/East), 19 (New West) and 54 (South West).
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meetings with all caseworkers to inform them about the experiment. At the start
of every three-month period each caseworker was instructed individually about
his new default option. Caseworkers were asked to fill in a form at each intake
meeting they had with an individual in the experiment sample. The forms were
personalized for each caseworker and had their default option pre-printed on the
form, such that they were constantly reminded of their current default option.
We kept track of the inflow and regularly tried to visit caseworkers if they had
not filled in the forms for new applicants or deviated substantially from their
given default option. During the experiment, we visited the welfare oﬃces almost
weekly to answer questions from caseworkers, pick up forms and to keep an eye
on the implementation of the experiment.12
4.3.4 Evidence on random assignment and compliance rates
Figure 4.2 shows the fraction of search periods per default option over the ex-
perimental period.13 The distinction between the three default options is most
pronounced at the start of the experiment. The percentage of search periods
given under the default ‘always’ remained relatively stable over time, while it
increased for the other two default options. During the experiment period the
policy of the welfare agency changed towards increased giving of search periods,
which can explain the increase under default option ‘normal’. Furthermore, given
the amount of caseworkers that we had to communicate with (112 caseworkers
in total) the increase in the number of search periods under the default option
‘never’ can be explained by new caseworkers entering the organization or replac-
ing other caseworkers without being briefed by us. On average over the research
period, caseworkers with default option ‘never’ gave a search period to nine per-
cent of applicants, caseworkers with default option ‘always’ gave a search period
to 55 percent of applicants and caseworkers with default option ‘normal’ gave a
search period to 46 percent of applicants.
Our design hinges on the fact that within local welfare oﬃces applicants are
randomly allocated to caseworkers, and are therefore also randomly allocated to
default options. Table 4.2 provides evidence on the success of the randomization.
The second to fourth column show the mean characteristics of applicants under
12The forms were filled in for 72 percent of the observations. Given that all information is
also available through the administrative records (for the full sample), we will not use the
information from the forms in our analysis. Initially, we introduced the forms because we
were not sure if the administrative system of the welfare oﬃce would also include applicants
that applied for benefits but never returned after a search period. This turned out to be the
case. However, for the experiment the forms were very useful as they had the default option
preprinted and gave us a reason to regularly check upon the caseworkers.
13The data on which this subsection is based is further discussed in section 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of applicants that was given a search period by default
option, over time
the default options ‘normal’, ‘always’ and ‘never’. Columns five to seven show
the p-value of the diﬀerence between two groups, for of all the diﬀerent combi-
nations. The characteristics seem to be well balanced over the three treatment
groups. The diﬀerences are only significantly diﬀerent from zero for five out of
42 of the reported characteristics. The lower panel in table 4.2 shows the treat-
ment probability for each of the three groups and the number of observations per
treatment group. The treatment group with the default ‘normal’ is the largest,
as this was agreed upon with the welfare agency.
Table 4.3 shows the characteristics of applicants under the default option
‘normal’, when the decision to apply a search period was left to the caseworker.
The first column represents the applicants that did not get a search period and
the second column those that did get a search period. The third column gives the
p-value of the diﬀerence. This table provides insight on how caseworkers target
the search period in a non-experimental setting. The results in this table confirm
that without experimental manipulation caseworkers target the assignment of a
search period. For example, applicants that get a search period are less likely to
have children and are younger.
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Table 4.2: Characteristics of applicants under diﬀerent default options
Full Default option P-value diﬀerence
Sample Norm. Alw. Nev. Norm Norm Alw
vs vs vs
Alw Nev Nev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Background Characteristics
Female 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.44 0.07*
Partner 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.79 0.68 0.57
Children 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.47 0.72 0.58
Age under 30 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.56 0.13 0.30
Age 31 - 36 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.07* 0.12 0.82
Age 37 - 45 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.96
Age above 45 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.07* 0.37
Bachelor/Master 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.66 0.59 0.52
Vocational 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21 1.00 0.53 0.47
High school 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.06* 0.85 0.08*
Prep. vocational 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.04** 0.68 0.19
Primary education 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.35 0.29 0.94
Education missing 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.37 0.30 0.79
Income 2 yrs 27.3 27.0 26.8 28.3 0.31 0.95 0.34
before (x1000€)
Treatment
Search Period 0.40 0.46 0.55 0.09 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 2788 1657 571 560
Note: The p-values in the last three columns are weighted by the oﬃce of registration, as
randomization took place within welfare oﬃce. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level,
⇤ =at 10% level
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Table 4.3: Targeting of caseworkers under default ‘normal’
Default normal p-value diﬀ
No Search period Search period
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.40 0.37 0.35
Partner 0.13 0.11 0.01**
Children 0.16 0.11 0.00***
Age under 30 0.20 0.30 0.00***
Age 31 - 36 0.21 0.26 0.02**
Age 37 - 45 0.30 0.23 0.00***
Age above 45 0.29 0.21 0.00***
Bachelor/Master 0.26 0.27 0.32
Vocational 0.24 0.24 0.90
High school 0.13 0.09 0.02**
Prep. vocational 0.22 0.20 0.36
Primary education 0.10 0.10 0.73
Education missing 0.01 0.05 0.00***
Income 2 yrs 27.5 26.5 0.32
before (x1000€)
Observations 899 758
Note: The p-values in the last three columns are weighted by the oﬃce of registration, as
randomization took place within welfare oﬃce. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level,
⇤ =at 10% level
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4.4 Data and empirical strategy
4.4.1 Data sources
Our analysis employs data from three diﬀerent sources, that are linked using
unique identifiers for each individual. The welfare agency of Amsterdam provides
administrative information on the date of registration at the welfare oﬃce, date of
application for welfare, start and end date of collecting welfare benefits, whether
a search period is applied and the name of the caseworker that conducted the
intake meeting. The individual characteristics of applicants that are registered
in these data are date of birth, gender, household composition and highest level
of education. Furthermore we observe the exact benefits payments. Next, we use
data from the nationwide social insurance administration to observe monthly in-
formation for each individual on the amount of income from employment, working
hours, type of employment and income from other benefit schemes.14 We have
this information for all participants in the experiment from 2008 up to October
2013. The retrospective nature of the data allows us to include labor market
history as a control variable. However, data on income from self-employment is
missing.
Additionally, we link the data to individual records of all Dutch citizens kept
by Statistics Netherlands. Using these records we can determine whether an in-
dividual was suspect of a crime in a given year and we can deduce relocation
behavior. Every inhabitant of the Netherlands has to be registered at a munici-
pality, so we can determine whether an individual moved within the country or
out of the country (in case an individual is not registered at any municipality).
Data from Statistics Netherlands cover the full population of the Netherlands
such that the experiment sample can be matched without attrition.
4.4.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
Based on inflow in previous years we expected 2500 individuals to participate
in the experiment. Our final sample consists of 2860 welfare applications (2709
unique individuals).15 Worsening economic circumstances are probably the expla-
nation for this increase. For 38 applicants we have an incorrect personal identifier,
such that we can not match them to their outcomes. For eight applicants we do
14The other benefit schemes include among others unemployment benefits and disability ben-
efits. Next to that we also observe whether someone receives welfare benefits in another
municipality.
15An individual can have multiple applications if she applies for benefits multiple times within
our experimental period. The average number of days elapsed between consecutive applica-
tions is 112.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics on outcomes, full sample
Mean SD
Labor market outcomes
Fraction of applicants in benefits after 6 months 0.51 0.50
Cum. benefits received over 6 months (in €) 2953 2413
Cum. earnings over 6 months (in €) 2494 3766
Cum. income from other benefits over 6 months (in €) 511 1715
Cum. total income over 6 months (in €) 5957 3653
Nr of weeks I[benefits > 0] over 6 months 16.2 10.8
Cum. hours worked over 6 months 190 266
Mean hourly wage over 6 months (in €, if I[wage > 0]) 13.3 6.3
Other outcomes
Moved out of municipality within one year 0.10 0.30
Moved out of country within one year 0.03 0.17
Suspect of a crime in 2012 or 2013 0.09 0.28
Suspect of a property crime in 2012 or 2013 0.04 0.20
Observations 2788
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not have information on their caseworker, so we can not determine under which
default option they were treated. Furthermore, for 24 applicants information
on the search period is missing, and for seven applicants information on essen-
tial controls is missing (gender, age or household situation). This means that
in total we exclude 72 observations from the analysis, which leaves us with 2788
observations (2640 unique individuals). For 64 of the 72 excluded observations
we have information on the default option. The missing observations are evenly
distributed among the three default options (joint p-value of 0.21).
The first column of table 4.2 provides information about background charac-
teristics. The majority of the applicants (over 60 percent) are male. Applicants
are relatively young: the average age in the sample is only 38.4 years, with the
median at 36 years. Recall that our sample includes only individuals older than
27 years. Young people have had less time to build up work history and, therefore,
have in general a shorter maximum UI entitlement. Average cumulative income
in the two years before applying is approximately 27,000 euro. Given that wel-
fare is means tested and the income of the partner is also taken into account in
the means test, couples are less likely to qualify for welfare. In our sample only
11 percent of the applicants have a partner, and 14 percent have children. The
singles living with children are almost exclusively women. Finally, 28% of the
applicants has at least a bachelor’s degree.
Table 4.4 contains information on the outcome variables. We will mainly look
at outcomes up to six months after registration. Table 4.4 shows that at that
moment 50 percent of the applicants are still receiving welfare benefits. Average
welfare payments per individual are 3,000 euro within six months and average
earnings are 2,500 euro. Income from other benefits (mainly unemployment and
disability benefits) is 511 euro. Total income is the sum of these three income
sources (welfare benefits, wage earnings and other benefits).
A search period might not only have an eﬀect on labor market outcomes. We
will, therefore, also look at other outcomes, specifically relocation and crime. For
these outcomes we look at one year after applying for benefits, as we expect that
a search period does not necessarily aﬀect these outcomes directly. Furthermore,
for the crime outcomes we do not know the exact date of the crime, just whether
an individual was the suspect of a crime in a given year. About 10 percent of
the applicants moved out of the municipality within one year, and three percent
of the applicants moved out of the country. Finally, 9 percent of the applicants
were the suspect of a crime in 2012 or 2013.
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4.4.3 Empirical strategy
To estimate the eﬀect of a search period on welfare receipt and other income
variables we assume a linear relationship between these outcomes of individual i
at time t who applied for welfare at time ⌧ at welfare oﬃce w (Yit⌧w ). SPi⌧ is an
indicator for whether the individual received a search period at the moment of
registration.
Yit⌧w = ↵t ⌧ +  ⌧ +  t ⌧SPi⌧ +Xi t ⌧ + !w,t ⌧ + uit⌧ (4.1)
In this equation t   ⌧ indicates the number of weeks elapsed between the day
of registration and the week in which the outcome is observed. Xi is a set of
covariates including age at registration, gender, partner status, an indicator for
children, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration and dummies
for five education categories. ↵t ⌧ and  ⌧ are fixed eﬀects for the number of
weeks elapsed since the registration and the quarter of registration. The latter
are included to take business cycle eﬀects into account. Finally, !w,t ⌧ are local
welfare oﬃce fixed eﬀects to control for diﬀerences between local welfare oﬃces
and other diﬀerences between the local labor market and the city districts that
they serve. The parameters of interest are  t ⌧ which describe the eﬀect of a search
period t   ⌧ weeks after registration. We estimate equation (4.1) separately for
each week since registration (t  ⌧). Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the applicant, to account for multiple applications per individual.
If caseworkers are more likely to give a search period to applicants with higher
potential earnings the OLS estimator of  t ⌧ will be biased. We exploit our
experimental design to estimate the causal eﬀect of the search period using two
strategies. First, we replace SPi⌧ by the default options of the caseworker that
conducted the intake meeting:
Yit⌧w = ↵t ⌧ + ⌧ + 1,t ⌧Normali⌧ + 2,t ⌧Alwaysi⌧ +Xi t ⌧ +!w,t ⌧ +uit⌧ (4.2)
Because compliance was not perfect,  1 and  2 are the intention-to-treat eﬀects
(ITT). The advantage of the ITT parameters is that they reflect the change in
outcomes if the welfare agency moves from abandoning search periods to the
current policy ( 1), or to a more strict ‘always’ policy ( 2). However, since the
parameters average over all applicants, also over those that did not receive a
search period, they do not reflect the size of the eﬀect of a search period. Therefore
we employ a second strategy, where we instrument SPi⌧ with the default option
of the caseworker that conducted the intake. We estimate a first-stage equation
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of the form:
SPi⌧ = ⌘t ⌧ +⌧ + 1,t ⌧Normali⌧ + 2,t ⌧Alwaysi⌧ +Xi✓w,t ⌧ + t ⌧ +vit⌧ (4.3)
In equation 4.3  1 and  2 reflect the diﬀerence in the probability to receive
a search period for caseworkers with the default options ‘normal’ and ‘always’,
compared to the default option ‘never’. We saw before that caseworkers with
the default option ‘normal’ (‘always’) give 36 percent (45 percent) more search
periods than caseworkers with the default option ‘never’.
Three key assumptions underlie our empirical strategy. First, for the default
options to be valid instruments for getting a search period, applicants’ assignment
to a caseworker must be uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics that could
influence labor market outcomes (conditional on observed characteristics). As
discussed before, applicants are assigned to caseworkers in a process that is unre-
lated to applicant characteristics. Because applicants are assigned to caseworkers
within a welfare oﬃce it is crucial to control for welfare oﬃce fixed eﬀects in our
analysis. Otherwise diﬀerences in the number of search periods applied under
the default options could reflect diﬀerences in populations of applicants between
locations, for example arising from diﬀerences in local labor market conditions.
Second,an assumption that is needed for the causal interpretation of the in-
strumental variables estimates is instrument monotonicity. No individual would
have received a search period from a caseworker with default option ‘never’ and
would not have received a search period from a caseworker with default option
‘always’. This is very likely to hold for the same caseworker. Formally, we see
that within a local welfare oﬃce some caseworkers have a higher search period
rate under ‘never’ than (other caseworkers) under ‘normal’ or ‘always’. However,
in our experiment some caseworkers only have a small number of applicants per
default option and observed diﬀerences in the fraction of applied search periods
can also reflect diﬀerences in the average characteristics of the applicants. Fur-
thermore, recall that only very few search periods are applied under the default
option ‘never’. Therefore, it is likely that an applicant who would receive a search
period under ‘never’ would also get this under any of the other options and the
monotonicity assumption is likely to hold.
Finally, the probability that an individual finds employment (with or with-
out a search period) should not be related to whether other individuals receive
a search period (stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)). Our design
increased the probability for some applicants to receive a search period, but de-
creased it for others, so on average approximately the same amount of search
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periods were given as before the experiment started. Furthermore, the treated
population in the experiment is only a small fraction of the total population of
unemployed in Amsterdam, which was reported to consist of around 42,000 indi-
viduals in 2013. Therefore, it is not likely that the about 1000 search periods in
our population have substantial spillover or general equilibrium eﬀects.
Using the instrumental variables, we estimate a Local Average Treatment Ef-
fect (LATE) (Angrist et al., 1996). The eﬀect of a search period is only identified
for the group applicants for which the caseworkers complied to their default op-
tions. In section 4.7 we elaborate further on the definition of compliers in the
setting of the experiment and the interpretation of our estimated eﬀect of a search
period.
4.4.4 Graphical evidence
We start with a graphical description of how labor market outcomes are related
to the three default options, before turning to a more detailed regression anal-
ysis. Figure 4.3 shows the fraction of applicants that receives welfare benefits
some period after registration by default option. Two issues are important before
interpreting the graph. First, an individual receives benefits in a certain week if
payments of benefits were made that are assigned to that week. For example,
if an applicant returns from a search period and receives benefits retrospectively
from the moment of applying, we count that person as being on benefits from the
registration onwards (even though the first actual payment took place after eight
weeks). This implies that a mechanical eﬀect of the search period, the delayed
payment of the first benefits, can not be a driver of possible eﬀects. Second, from
the figure it is clear that take-up of welfare benefits is less than 100 percent for
all three default options. This arises because eligibility for welfare benefits is only
determined if the application for benefits is activated, so after the intake meet-
ing and a possible search period. If an individual does not return after a search
period it will not be observable whether that individual would have been eligible
for benefits. Therefore, our sample is determined based on all the applicants that
have an intake meeting; conditioning on eligibility can lead to confounding eﬀects
as it is a possible outcome variable.16
Figure 4.3 shows that under the default option ‘never’ the fraction of people
receiving welfare is higher than under the default ‘always’. The fraction receiving
welfare under the default option ‘normal’ is in between the two, but closer to
16The increase in the fraction during week one to five are mainly people who register at the
welfare oﬃce before the date of exhaustion of UI benefits (which is advised by the benefit
oﬃce to prevent financial problems due to the processing time in which no welfare benefits
are received).
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Figure 4.3: Fraction of applicants receiving welfare benefits by default option
the default option ‘always’. This suggests that a search period has a substantial
eﬀect on the probability to be on welfare. Over time the diﬀerence between the
three default options decreases, but 26 weeks after registration applicants under
the default option ‘never’ are still more likely to receive benefits.
Figure 4.4 provides information on all possible sources of income that an
individual can have, split by default option and for 10, 20 and 30 weeks after
registration. We distinguish the income sources as being on welfare, receiving a
combination of wages and welfare, receiving only wage, being dependent on other
benefits and finally to have no (observed) source of income. The latter group
can, among others, include individuals that are self-employed, that move in with
a partner or parents or have unreported income. Again it is clear that both after
10 and 20 weeks applicants in the default group ‘never’ are more likely to receive
welfare benefits or a combination of wage and welfare benefits than applicants in
the other two default groups. In Figure 4.4 we can see which other sources of
income they depend upon. Ten weeks after registration applicants in the default
groups ‘normal’ and ‘always’ are more likely to have no (observed) source of
income. After 20 weeks the proportion of applicants with no observed income is
fairly equal again for the three default options, but applicants from the defaults
‘normal’ and ‘always’ are more likely to receive wages. Finally, after 30 weeks the
proportions of the diﬀerent sources of income are very similar for the three default
groups. These results suggest that a search period reduces the probability to be
on welfare, which during the first weeks leads to a higher probability to have no
income but later the loss in income is compensated by an increased probability to
have a job. In the next section we will show whether these observed diﬀerences
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Figure 4.4: Source of income by default option
are also statistically significant.
4.5 Results
The presentation of the main results is divided into five parts. We first present
and discuss estimates of the eﬀect of a search period on the likelihood to receive
welfare benefits. We continue with estimates of the eﬀect of a search period on
earnings and other benefits, followed by a discussion of the impact on relocation
and crime. Finally, we look at the long-term eﬀects of a search period.
Welfare benefits
In Figure 4.5a we plot the point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals of
the intention-to-treat eﬀect on the probability to receive benefits (0/1) for each
week after registration (following equation (4.2)). In this figure, default options
‘always’ and ‘normal’ are compared to the default option ‘never’. We see that
individuals with a caseworker with default option ‘always’ have a ten percentage
point lower probability to receive welfare. Over time the eﬀect becomes slightly
smaller. Individuals with a caseworker with the default ‘normal’ have a six per-
centage point lower probability to receive welfare. More than 20 weeks after
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registration both eﬀects are still significantly diﬀerent from zero. The results are
summarized in Table 4.5, that reports the eﬀect of the default options on cumula-
tive outcomes half a year after registration. The first and second column provide
estimates that only include controls for quarter and location of registration, the
third and fourth column also control for background characteristics of the appli-
cant. The estimates hardly change with the inclusion of the control variables, a
result to be expected since the default options were randomly assigned. In Ta-
ble 4.5 we see that compared to the default option ‘never’, the number of weeks
that applicants in the default group ‘normal’ receive benefits is reduced by 1.72
weeks. For applicants in the group ‘always’ the eﬀect is larger and amounts to
2.18 weeks less. Recall that this is not a mechanical eﬀect of the search period.
The entitlement to benefits starts at the date of registration and independent of
a search period applicants receive benefits from this day on.
To get an idea about the size of the eﬀect of a search period, we next estimate
the eﬀect using an instrumental variables strategy. The first-stage estimates of
the default options on the probability to receive a search period are respectively
0.34 (s.e. 0.02) for the default ‘normal’ and 0.46 (s.e. 0.02) for the default ‘never’,
with an F-statistic of the instruments of 237. Figure 4.5b plots the point estimates
of the instrumental variable estimates of the probability to receive welfare. We
see that a search period lowers the probability to receive welfare with around
20 percentage points in the first ten weeks. Given that in the group with the
default option ‘never’ total take up of welfare benefits is around 80 percent this
implies a reduction of about 25 percent. After the tenth week the eﬀect somewhat
decreases to minus 11 percentage points in week 26. The eﬀect of a search period
is still significantly diﬀerent from zero 26 weeks after registration. This implies
that the search period does not only delay the start of benefits with a few weeks,
but it also has a more profound and longer lasting eﬀect on welfare uptake.
Figure 4.5b uses a binary variable for receiving welfare. Welfare recipients are,
however, obliged to accept part-time jobs and, therefore, also partial outflow can
take place. In order to look at the total impact of the search period on welfare
receipt Figure 4.6a looks at the eﬀect of a search period on the amount of welfare
benefits an individual receives. The pattern is quite similar to the pattern in
Figure 4.5b with the binary welfare variable. The search period has a strong
eﬀect on welfare receipt that is long lasting and only becomes insignificant after
24 weeks. On average, about 30 euro per week is saved on welfare benefits if
a search period is imposed. In the first row of Table 4.5 we see that a search
period reduces the amount of weeks that an individual receives welfare by 4.8
weeks. Total welfare benefits paid out decrease with 814 euro, which amounts to
a 25 percent reduction of the mean cumulative amount of welfare over the first
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26 weeks.
Income from wages and other benefits
Not receiving welfare does not necessarily imply that someone is employed. Ap-
plicants could feel discouraged to apply for welfare by the search period. The
remainder of Figure 4.6 shows the eﬀect of a search period on other sources of
income. Figure 4.6b shows the eﬀect of the search period on weekly income from
employment (income from self-employment is not observed). A search period has
a positive eﬀect on earnings of about 30 euro per week that becomes significant
after five weeks. After 14 weeks the eﬀect steadily increases to 50 euro a week.
Table 4.5 shows that during the first half year after registration individuals with
a search period earn in total 909 euro more than individuals without a search
period. This implies that on average individuals with a search period completely
compensate (112 percent) their forgone welfare benefits by income from employ-
ment.
A spillover eﬀect of a search period could be that individuals try to get income
from another benefit scheme or apply for welfare benefits in a diﬀerent munici-
pality. We do not expect large eﬀects here, as welfare should be the safety net
and people only apply if there is no other benefit scheme they are entitled to.
Second, people would need to move in order to apply for welfare benefits in a
diﬀerent municipality. Figure 4.6c shows the estimates of the eﬀect on income
from other benefit schemes and these are indeed small and insignificant. This is
confirmed by the insignificant eﬀect on cumulative other benefits in Table 4.5.
Finally, the eﬀect of a search period on total income (the sum of income from
welfare, wages and other benefits) is shown in Figure 4.6d. During the first four
weeks the eﬀect on total income is negative and (almost) significant. After that,
the eﬀect is close to zero and insignificant. The eﬀect on cumulative total income
is small and not significantly diﬀerent from zero (Table 4.5). The negative eﬀect
during the first four weeks might be caused by individuals that find employment
within the search period, and do not apply for benefits for the weeks they spent
searching before they found a job.
The increase in earnings can be driven by three diﬀerent channels. First, an
increased probability to have a job, second, an increase in the amount of hours
worked or third, an increase in the hourly wage. In the remainder of Table 4.5
we look at several outcomes to distinguish these channels. First, we see that
a search period does not have a significant eﬀect on the number of weeks that
an applicant has a non-zero wage, although the point estimate is positive. The
number of hours worked is, however, significantly increased by the search period.
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Table 4.5: Eﬀect of search period on cumulative outcomes 26 weeks after regis-
tration
Intention to treat Intention to treat IV
Always Normal Always Normal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nr of weeks I[benefits>0] -2.05*** -1.64*** -2.18*** -1.72*** -4.78***
(0.63) (0.56) (0.62) (0.56) (1.25)
Benefits received (in €) -372*** -260** -389*** -261** -814***
(142) (127) (141) (126) (287)
Earnings (in €) 348 291 407* 342* 909**
(225) (197) (220) (195) (449)
Other benefits (in €) -50 -51 -42 -68 -122
(98) (88) (95) (87) (199)
Total income (in €) -74 19 -25 13 -27
(218) (193) (213) (189) (438)
Nr of weeks I[earnings>0] 0.71 0.35 0.75 0.40 1.48
(0.35) (0.54) (0.60) (0.54) (1.23)
Cum. hours worked 26* 18 30* 21 64**
(16) (14) (16) (14) (31)
Mean hourly wage (in €) 0.71 0.30 0.72 0.26 1.78
(conditional on work) (0.60) (0.43) (0.58) (0.43) (1.33)
Observations 2788 2788 2788
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes Yes Yes
Location of registration Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) in each row represent one equation. The
fifth column represents a separate equation. The controls for applicant characteristics include
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before
registration and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors clustered at the level
of the applicant. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level.
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Applicants that receive a search period work 64 hours more, an increase of 36
percent. This signals that a search period mainly increases the likelihood to
find a full-time job compared to finding a part-time job in which the applicant
does not earn enough to leave benefits. Finally, we estimate the eﬀect on mean
hourly wage (conditional on having a job).17 A search period could reduce the
quality of the job that individuals are willing to accept, in case they are liquidity
constraint and quickly accept a job to have an income. On the other hand, being
on benefits can have a stigma eﬀect on future employers by giving a bad signal
about the quality of the employee. In that case the fact that a search period
reduces the likelihood to receive benefits can translate into a positive eﬀect on
the mean hourly wage. The positive point estimate in Table 4.5 points more in
the direction of the second explanation, although the eﬀect is not significant.
Long-run eﬀects
So far we have mainly looked at outcomes up to half a year after registration. In
Figure 4.5b we saw that 26 weeks after registration the eﬀect of a search period
became insignificant. A search period can still have long-term eﬀects though.
If a search period causes individuals to accept short-term low-wage jobs and
individuals without a search period find more stable employment, then the long-
term eﬀect of a search period can potentially be negative. Table 4.6 presents the
instrumental variable results for 26, 52 and 78 weeks after registration. For 78
weeks the sample is smaller because not everyone is observed for such a long time.
Table 4.6 shows that, although precision decreases due to larger standard
errors, the point estimates of the eﬀects are fairly stable over time. The main
eﬀect of a search period thus takes place during the first 26 weeks, and after that
not much changes, neither in a positive nor in a negative way. The savings that
are realized on the amount of benefits paid out are, therefore, permanent savings,
that are not oﬀset by a later increase in benefit dependency.18 One thing that
sticks out is the positive and significant eﬀect on mean hourly wage one year after
registration, an increase of 21 percent compared to individuals without a search
period. This can be explained by a stigma eﬀect of receiving welfare benefits
on future employers and possible duration dependence of the mean hourly wage
17We condition on having a job in order to abstract from the possible employment eﬀect of a
search period. If a search period has a positive eﬀect on the employment probability including
the zeros could wrongly lead to the conclusion that a search period leads to a better paid
job. Conditioning on having a job does imply that there is a possible composition eﬀect: If
more people work with a search period also those with a lower wage potential work. This
will, however, only bias the results for mean hourly wage downwards.
18In order to know whether this also holds for the really long term we would have to repeat
this analysis in the future. As our research sample is matched to the database of Statistics
Netherlands this can be realized later.
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on unemployment duration. These results clearly opposes the idea that a search
period induces applicants to accept lower quality jobs.
Relocation
In the previous subsection we saw that a search period leads to higher earnings.
One of the mechanisms through which this eﬀect can run is that a search pe-
riod induces applicants to search for a job in a larger geographical area, thereby
increasing their likelihood to find a job.19 Alternatively, individuals that are dis-
couraged about the possibility to receive welfare benefits might move in with their
partner or parents in order to save costs. The upper part of Table 4.7 reports the
instrumental variable eﬀects of a search period on the likelihood te relocate. We
present the results separately for relocation out of the municipality and reloca-
tion out of the country (emigration). A search period increases the likelihood to
move out of the municipality by eight percentage points. Relative to a moving
rate of nine percent for individuals without a search period this is a substantial
eﬀect (an increase of 90 percent). A search period does not induce individuals to
emigrate, as we do not find an eﬀect on relocation out of the country.
Crime
A search period increases the time that an individual has to bridge without in-
come. Applicants of welfare benefits are unlikely to have access to savings or
credit that can cover such temporary cash shortfalls. Individuals with a low
earnings prospects in regular economic activities might, therefore, turn to crime
to supplement their income during this period. For example, Foley (2011) finds
that in the US crime rates increase in the amount of time that has passed since
welfare payments occurred. Table 4.4 shows that of our sample nine percent was
the suspect of a crime in 2012 and/or 2013 (compared to approximately two per-
cent of the total population aged between 27 and 65) which indicates that for our
population crime is not an irrelevant outcome.
Before turning to the results a few things need to be mentioned. First, by
the nature of the data, we only consider registered crime, which is likely to be
an underestimation of actual crime. There is, however, not a clear reason to
suspect a diﬀerence in the likelihood to get caught for the diﬀerent treatment
groups. Second, we only know whether an individual was the suspect of a crime,
not whether he or she was actually convicted. However, in the Netherlands, on
19We could look at occupational categories to address whether a search period also the broadness
of occupations for which an individual applies. However, the occupational categories in our
data are so broadly defined that it is not possible to give a sensible answer to this question.
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Table 4.6: Instrumental variable eﬀects search period on long term outcomes
Nr of weeks since registration
26 weeks 52 weeks 78 weeks
(1) (2) (3)
Nr of weeks I[benefits > 0] -4.78*** -5.87** -8.40*
(1.25) (2.47) (4.98)
Benefits received (in €) -814*** -824 -971
(287) (536) (1063)
Earnings (in €) 909** 965 765
(449) (971) (2069)
Other benefits (in €) -122 -7 542
(199) (390) (856)
Total income (in €) -27 133 337
(438) (938) (2020)
Nr of weeks I[Earnings > 0] 1.48 0.42 0.10
(1.23) (2.39) (4.82)
Cum. hours worked 64** 62 40
(31) (68) (144)
Mean hourly wage (in €) 1.38 1.76** 1.72
(conditional on work) (1.17) (0.79) (1.26)
Observations 2788 2788 1399
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes Yes Yes
Location of registration Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one regression. All regressions include controls for age at regis-
tration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
applicant. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level.
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Table 4.7: Eﬀect of search period on relocation and crime
IV
(1)
Relocated (out of municipality) within 52 weeks 0.08**
(0.03)
Relocated (out of country) within 52 weeks 0.03
(0.02)
Suspect of a crime in 2012 or 2013 -0.02
(0.04)
Suspect of a property crime in 2012 or 2013 -0.01
(0.03)
Observations 2788
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes
Location of registration Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes
Note: Each cell represents one regression. The controls for applicant characteristics include
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before
registration and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the applicant. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level.
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average, 90 percent of the suspects are declared guilty (CBS et al., 2013), such
that this is a very strong indicator for actually having committed a crime. Third,
we do not know the exact date of the crime, just the year in which the crime
was registered. This means we cannot consider the exact time elapsed between
the application for benefits and the crime. We take as an outcome whether an
individual was suspected of a crime in the year 2012 and/or 2013 (remember that
the experiment started in April 2012 and ended in March 2013). This means that
the crime could have taken place before the search period was issued. Given the
randomized design there is no reason to suspect a diﬀerence in crime rates before
the start of the experiment.
The lower part of Table 4.7 reports the instrumental variable eﬀect of a search
period on the likelihood to be the suspect of a crime. Following Foley (2011), we
also look only at property crimes, to separate out crimes that have a financial
motivation. For both outcomes we find no support for the claim that a search
period increases crime rates. To check whether the eﬀects are sensitive to the
definition of our outcome measure we repeat the analysis by period of registration,
and only for crimes committed in 2013 (results not reported). Persistently, we
find no evidence of an eﬀect of the search period on crime.
4.6 Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
In this section we explore whether there is heterogeneity in the eﬀect of a search
period. First, we look at three important determinants of labor market outcomes:
age, gender and education. Next, we investigate whether the eﬀect of the search
period diﬀers by the moment of application. Such a diﬀerence could indicate
that the eﬀect of a search period depends on the labor market circumstances.
Finally, we study variation in the eﬀect of a search period by looking at the
income distribution. This is motivated by the concern that although a search
period might on average have a positive eﬀect on labor market outcomes, there
can still be a group that is seriously harmed by a search period.
Gender, age and education
Figure 4.7 shows the eﬀects on receiving welfare benefits for three diﬀerent edu-
cation groups. We distinguish between at least a bachelor degree (high), a basic
qualification (middle) and less than a basic qualification (low).20 The eﬀects
20A basic qualification is the government definition for the minimum level of education needed
to be self-suﬃcient on the labor market. Such a qualification requires at least senior gen-
eral secondary education, pre-university education, or level-2 of senior secondary vocational
education.
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Figure 4.7: Treatment eﬀects by education: probability on welfare
shown in the figure are estimated using a joint model for the three educational
groups including interactions. For ease of presentation, the confidence intervals
are not shown in the figure. The eﬀects are significant for almost all weeks for
applicants with at least a bachelor degree and those with a basic qualification.
For the group with less than a basic qualification the point estimates are negative
but the eﬀect is not significant.
There are clear diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of search periods between sub-
groups. The eﬀect is largest for applicants with at least a bachelor degree. For
them a search period reduces the probability to receive welfare benefits by almost
40 percentage points. The eﬀect is large, in particular since the take up of welfare
benefits for this group of applicants is around 80 percent. The eﬀect of a search
period on the probability to receive welfare benefits monotonically declines with
the level of education, but is negative for all three groups. The eﬀect for the
group with at least a bachelor degree is significantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect for
applicants with less than a basic qualification. Table 4.ii in the appendix reports
the eﬀects on the other (cumulative) outcomes for the diﬀerent education groups.
For most outcomes the eﬀect sizes monotonically increase with the level of ed-
ucation, and have the same sign for all three groups. For the number of weeks
on welfare benefits and total welfare benefits received the estimates for the group
with at least a bachelor degree are significantly diﬀerent from those for applicants
with less than a basic qualification. Overall the results by education level suggest
that a search period is most eﬀective for individuals that have better prospects
on the labor market, as reflected by their level of education.
Figure 4.ii in the appendix shows the eﬀect of a search period on the probabil-
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ity to receive benefits split by gender (left) and above/below median age (right).
In both cases the estimated coeﬃcients are very similar. The lack of diﬀerential
eﬀects on these dimensions can be a result of the construction of the target pop-
ulation. Compared to the general population, welfare applicants are quite young
(older workers have longer entitlement to UI benefits) and are less likely to have
an (income-generating) partner. Furthermore, search periods are only applied to
individuals for whom there are no direct restrictions to work. So, for example,
single mothers are excluded from the target population.
Business cycle eﬀects
Our experiment took place during an economic downturn (see Figure 4.i in the
appendix), which complicates finding work for everyone. On the other hand, the
population of applicants for welfare benefits have, on average, better characteris-
tics than during economically better times. It is a priori not clear how the eﬀect
of a search period varies when labor market conditions change. We can exploit
changes in labor market conditions during our experiment period. In Figure 4.i
we see that in the second half of the experimental period, the last quarter of 2012
and the first quarter of 2013, there was a sharp increase in the inflow into welfare
benefits. However, the estimated eﬀect of a search period is the same for appli-
cants in both time periods (estimates not reported). So, we do not find strong
evidence that the eﬀect of a search period varies with labor market conditions,
although we should note that we only observe a modest variation in labor market
conditions.
Distributional impacts
In section 4.5 we found that the loss in benefits is completely (112 percent) com-
pensated by an increase in earnings. However, given that the minimum wage
for a full-time job (approximately 1200 euro per month) is substantially higher
than the level of welfare benefits the earnings gain can be unequally distributed
along the income distribution. If that is the case, giving a search period can
still be harmful for part of the applicants. To inquire this further we estimate
the marginal distribution of the outcome under diﬀerent treatments for the sub-
population of compliers, following Imbens and Rubin (1997).21 In our case the
compliers are not the applicants but the caseworkers, that comply with their
default option or not. This implies that we estimate the distribution of income
for applicants that received a search period because their caseworker complied to
21This method is briefly explained in appendix 2.B.
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Figure 4.8: Income distribution of compliers to the default options
the default ‘normal’ and ‘always’ and for applicants that did not receive a search
period because their caseworker complied to the default ‘never’. For sake of rep-
resentation we take the default options ‘always’ and ‘normal’ together, thereby
reducing the instrument to a binary instrument. The analysis could, however, be
extended to consider both instruments separately.
Figure 4.8 plots the estimated distributions of cumulative income for appli-
cants that did or did not receive a search period because their caseworker com-
plied with the default options. Both 26 and 52 weeks after registration we see
that the income distribution of the ‘treated’ compliers shifts slightly to the the
right. The treated compliers are however more likely to have a very low (close to
zero) cumulative income. This suggests that for the majority of the applicants
a search period has a positive eﬀect on income, they find a job in which they
earn more than the benefits level. However, for a fraction of the applicants a
search period leads to a higher probability to have a very low income. Regression
results (not reported) confirm that during the first ten weeks after registration
a search period leads to a higher probability to have an income below 150 euro
per week. This is below the welfare benefits level so after a search period some
individuals neither have earnings nor receive benefits. After ten weeks this eﬀect
is no longer significant. This indicates that some individuals are harmed because
of the search period as they have very little income for some weeks, up to two
months after registration.
In the previous subsection we reported that the eﬀect of a search period is
particularly large for highly educated applicants. Figure 4.9 therefore estimates
the complier distributions split by level of education. We see that the higher
probability to have very low income is mainly driven by the highly educated
applicants (with a bachelor and/or master degree). It could be that there are two
eﬀective elements in the signal the search period sends out to applicants. The
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Figure 4.9: Income distribution (after 26 weeks) of compliers to the default op-
tions
first element is that they are forced to actively look for employment during the
search period to get welfare. The second element in the signal is that all jobs
should be accepted, even if this is work far below the educational and experience
level of the applicant. For highly educated individuals the second element could
have more impact than for individuals with less education and even cause them to
choose no income over welfare benefits. Furthermore, recall that we do not have
information about income from self-employment. However, we do know whether
applicants were self-employed before they applied for benefits. A regression of an
indicator for self-employment before application indicates that highly educated
applicants are 10 percentage points more likely to be self-employed (relative to a
base of 20 percent), If self-employment before application is positively related to
self-employment after application this is an additional explanation for the higher
likelihood to have a very low income.
4.7 Interpretation
Our estimated eﬀect of a search period should be interpreted as a local average
treatment eﬀect. Recall that the caseworker decides about giving a search period
to an applicant and that this decision depends on the default option assigned to
the caseworker. In this section we provide some interpretation of the compliers
for which we estimate the average treatment eﬀect and test if the estimated eﬀect
changes when we consider other groups of compliers. The latter is informative
about how well caseworkers can target search periods.
Suppose it is possible to rank applicants according to an (unobserved) in-
dex which we refer to as the propensity not to receive a search period. This
propensity can be based on characteristics observed by the caseworker, but not
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by us. Applicants that are always given a search period have propensity zero and
applicants with a propensity of one never receive a search period. For ease of pre-
sentation we assume that these propensities are uniformly distributed. And, for
the moment, we assume that there is no heterogeneity among caseworkers when
executing the three default options. Then these default options can be translated
into thresholds. Under the default option ‘never’ search periods are only assigned
to applicants with a propensity less than 0.09 and these applicants are the always
takers. Under the default option ‘always’ all applicants with a propensity less
than 0.55 are assigned a search period. Therefore, applicants with a propensity
above 0.55 are the never takers and those with a propensity between 0.09 and 0.55
the compliers. The default option ‘normal’ splits the compliers in two groups.
First, applicants with a propensity between 0.09 and 0.46 who comply to both the
default option ‘normal’ and ‘always’. And second, applicants with a propensity
between 0.46 and 0.55, who only comply to the default option ‘always’.
If the eﬀect of a search period is the same for all applicants, or if it only de-
pends on applicant’s characteristics that do not aﬀect the propensity, the average
treatment eﬀects are the same for the compliers to the default options ‘normal’
and ‘always’ (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). However, there may be applicant-
level heterogeneity in the response to the search period. For example, caseworkers
may target search periods mainly to applicants for whom they expect the largest
eﬀects. In that case the eﬀect is decreasing in the applicant’s propensity and the
estimated eﬀect depends on the thresholds chosen by the caseworker. This relates
to Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), who develop a framework in which they express
treatment parameters as diﬀerent weighted averages of the marginal treatment
eﬀects (MTE). In our case this means that the average treatment eﬀect is smaller
for the compliers to the default option ‘always’ than for the compliers to the
default option ‘normal’.
Nonparametric identification of the full set of MTEs requires an instrument
that generates variation on the full support of the probability of treatment as-
signment. Our default options do not have this property.22 However, we consider
two alternative approaches to investigate if the eﬀect of a search period declines
in the applicant’s propensity to receive a search period. First, we exploit that
we have two defaults options deviating from never giving a search period (‘nor-
mal’ and ‘always’), which generate diﬀerent groups of compliers. And second,
we increase the group of compliers by only considering caseworkers with high
compliance rates to the default options.
22We could exploit diﬀerences in rates at which caseworkers assign search periods under the
diﬀerent default options (e.g. Maestas et al. (2013)). This yields much more variation, but
the average number of applicants is low which incorporates a lot of noise.
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Table 4.8: Comparing the two instruments, outcomes 26 weeks after registration
Total P-value Normal vs Always vs
sample over-id Never Normal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nr of weeks I[benefits > 0] -4.78*** 0.88 -5.17*** -4.02
(1.25) (1.63) (4.59)
Benefits received (in €) -814*** 0.75 -723* -1063
(287) (371) (1024)
Earnings (in €) 909** 0.83 979* 733
(449) (582) (1650)
Other benefits (in €) -122 0.61 -246 125
(199) (258) (689)
Total income (in €) -27 0.84 10 -204
(438) (562) (1526)
Nr of weeks I[Earnings > 0] 1.48 0.72 1.10 3.19
(1.23) (1.60) (4.51)
Cum. hours worked 64** 0.91 64 87
(31) (41) (121)
Mean hourly wage (in €) 1.38 0.49 0.55 3.30
(conditional on work) (1.17) (1.27) (3.30)
First stage coeﬃcient 0.34*** 0.34***
default normal (0.02) (0.02)
First stage coeﬃcient 0.46*** 0.12***
default always (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 2788 2217 2228
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes Yes Yes
Location of registration Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include controls for age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration and dum-
mies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level
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Figure 4.10: Percentage of search periods applied by default option and case-
worker
For the first approach we perform overidentification tests. In the LATE-
framework with two valid instruments, rejection of the overidentification test
indicates that treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous (Angrist and Fernandez-Val,
2013). The intuition is that both instruments define diﬀerent groups of compliers
which have diﬀerent average treatment eﬀects. The second column of Table 4.8
shows that the p-values for this overidentification test are for none of the outcomes
below 0.49. This suggests that either that both complier populations are very
similar or that there is not much heterogeneity in the MTEs of search periods.
Given that the default options ‘always’ and ‘normal’ yield complier populations
which largely overlap, the first explanation is not unlikely.
Next, we estimate the eﬀect of a search period using the following two strate-
gies:
1. Instrument the search period with the default ‘normal’ with as a reference
group individuals with the default ‘never’
2. Instrument the search period with the default ‘always’ with as a reference
group individuals with the default ‘normal’
The first strategy captures the average treatment eﬀect for applicants with a
propensity between 0.09 and 0.46, while the second strategy captures the average
treatment eﬀect for applicants with a propensity between 0.46 and 0.55. For the
first strategy, we exclude all applicants under the default option ‘always’, and for
the second strategy we exclude all applicants under the default option ‘never’. If
caseworkers, indeed, mainly target search periods to applicants for which eﬀects
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are highest, the estimated eﬀects are smaller when estimated under the second
strategy. Table 4.8 presents the results for the total sample (column (1)) and
for the two strategies (columns (3) and (4)). The estimates in the third column
are not very precise, due to less power in the first stage, but the point estimates
are very similar to those in the second column. Again, there is no evidence that
MTEs are decreasing in the propensity not to receive a search period.
This first approach exploits the diﬀerence in the rate at which search periods
are applied under the default option ‘normal’ and ‘always’. Recall that the rates
are not very diﬀerent, which aﬀects the power of the analysis. Furthermore,
it can be that MTEs are very diﬀerent for those applicants with much higher
propensities. Therefore, we consider for each caseworker the compliance. Figure
4.10a compares for each caseworkers the rate at which they give search periods
under the default options ‘normal’ and ‘never’. Each circle represents a caseworker
and the size of the circle describes the number of applicants a caseworker had
under the default option ‘never’.
Three things come to the attention. First, there is substantial variation in the
rate at which caseworkers assign search periods under the default option ‘normal’.
There are caseworkers who almost never apply a search period, also under this
default option. Second, caseworkers who normally assign many search periods,
substantially reduce this if they are assigned the default option ‘never’, although
they do not completely quit applying search periods. And third, there are a few
caseworkers who do not change behavior when being assigned the default option
‘never’, i.e. under this default option they give as often search periods as under
the default option ‘normal’.
Figure 4.10b shows the same graph but now comparing the default option
‘always’ with the default option ‘normal’. The figure is less pronounced than
the previous figure. Obviously, many caseworkers find it diﬃcult to apply search
periods more often than usually. There are also some caseworkers who normally
already apply search periods so often that this can hardly be increased when they
are assigned the default option ‘always’. Finally, there are some caseworkers who
more or less refuse to give search periods. Even under the default option ‘always’
they (almost) never apply search periods.
Because within local oﬃces applicants are randomly assigned to caseworkers,
we can restrict our sample to caseworkers with substantial compliance rates to the
default options without harming the randomization.23 This excludes caseworkers
from the analysis that clearly did not comply with the assigned default options.
The higher compliance rates increase the set of compliers, but it may also have
23Restricting the sample implies that we only consider all applicants assigned to a number of
caseworkers.
116
some economic meaning when it is the case that caseworkers are more likely to
listen to their managers than to us. In Table 4.9 we proceed in three steps and
remove applicants of caseworkers that do not comply with the following rules:
1. Fraction ‘never’ < 20% & fraction ‘always’ > 40%
2. Fraction ‘never’ < 10% & fraction ‘always’ > 40%
3. Fraction ‘never’ < 10% & fraction ‘always’ > 60%
We only remove observations if a caseworker had more than five applicants in the
relevant default option, such that we do not run the risk of removing caseworkers
that had a very peculiar draw of applicants. A regression of an indicator for the
diﬀerent samples that remain under these selection criteria on applicant charac-
teristics shows that there are no observable diﬀerences between applicants in the
diﬀerent groups (see Table 4.iii in the appendix). Only the indicator for the local
welfare oﬃce is significant. This confirms that compliance to te experiment dif-
fered between local oﬃces. Table 4.9 presents the estimated eﬀects for the search
periods for the diﬀerent subsamples. At the bottom of the table we see that
by removing non-complying caseworkers, the first-stage coeﬃcients increase. In
the most strictly defined sample (column 4) the estimates now cover propensities
from 0.06 to 0.71 percent. Looking at the results, there is no evidence that the
eﬀect of a search period decreases with the propensity not to receive a search
period. The eﬀect on earnings even becomes slightly larger.
Overall none of the above strategies indicates that the eﬀect of a search period
decreases in the propensity not to receive a search period. It also shows that the
local average treatment eﬀect are not sensitive to changes in the sample and the
group of compliers. This shows that caseworkers do not manage to target search
period to those applicants for which the eﬀects are largest.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper studies mandatory search periods for new applicants for welfare bene-
fits. During such a four-week search period applicants have to very actively search
for a job, and their first payment of benefits is postponed. We designed a field
experiment based on an encouragement design to investigate both the short and
long-run eﬀects of applying these search periods. For the empirical evaluation
we supplement data from the experiment with various sources of administrative
data, to determine the applicants’ possible alternative sources of income.
Our empirical results provide evidence for a strong and persistent eﬀect of a
search period on receipt of welfare benefits. Six months after applying for welfare
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Table 4.9: Outcomes for diﬀerent groups of compliers
Total Nev<20% Nev<10% Nev<10%
sample Alw>40% Alw>40% Alw>60%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nr of weeks I[benefits>0] -4.78*** -4.28*** -4.66*** -5.72***
(1.25) (1.21) (1.26) (1.55)
Benefits received (in €) -814*** -647** -749*** -813**
(287) (275) (285) (326)
Earnings (in €) 909** -832* 912** 1386***
(449) (429) (440) (518)
Other benefits (in €) -122 -127 -86 -83
(199) (184) (199) (239)
Total income (in €) -27 58 77 490
(438) (422) (434) (511)
Nr of weeks I[Earnings>0] 1.48 1.60 1.92 2.99**
(1.23) (1.17) (1.23) (1.39)
Cum. hours worked 64** 54* 58* 83**
(31) (30) (31) (37)
Mean hourly wage (in €) 1.38 1.63 0.81 1.05
(conditional on work) (1.17) (1.19) (0.97) (1.08)
First stage default normal 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.39***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
First stage default always 0.46*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.63***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2788 2373 2207 1603
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location of registration Yes Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one equation. All regressions include controls for age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration and dum-
mies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level
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the total benefits payments are reduced by, on average, 25 percent. The lower in-
come from welfare benefits is fully compensated (112 percent) by increased income
from employment and there are no spillovers to other benefit schemes. A search
period increases the likelihood to relocate to another municipality, but does not
increase the likelihood to engage in crime. The eﬀect of a search period increases
with education, for applicants with at least a bachelor degree the likelihood to
collect welfare benefits decreases with 50 percent. A search period increases the
probability that high-educated applicants have a very low income. We do not
find evidence for negative side eﬀects for the most vulnerable applicants. Finally,
we show that the estimated eﬀect is not very sensitive to changes in the group of
compliers. Taken together, our results suggest that a search period is an eﬀective
way to target welfare benefits to those people who need it most.
This study shows that a combination of stricter job search requirements and
increased complexity of the application process reduces the take up of welfare
benefits. Since the administrative costs of imposing a search period are minimal,
it is also a very cost eﬀective policy instrument. Furthermore, we show that with
our encouragement design which allows for opting out in special cases, it is pos-
sible to evaluate (existing) policies using a randomized experiment for recipients
of welfare benefits. The opt-out possibility has been important to obtain support
of caseworkers, which ensured suﬃcient compliance to our randomization.
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4.A Appendix tables
Table 4.i: Benefit levels, net in € per month
Housing costs
Full Shared
Single without children 935.80 802.12
Single with children 1203.19 1069.50
Couple without children 1336.87 1203.19
Couple with children 1336.87 1203.19
Note: Benefit levels for the period July 1 to December 31 in 2012, including holiday allowance.
Benefit levels outside this time frame diﬀer only marginally. Shared housing costs apply if the
costs are shared with an individual that is not the partner or child.
120
Table 4.ii: Treatment eﬀects by level of education 26 weeks after registration
Education level
Lower Middle High
(1) (2) (3)
Nr of weeks I[benefits > 0] -2.49 -4.32** -7.94***
(2.15) (1.98) (2.16)
Benefits received (in €) -277 -838* -1442***
(483) (470) (488)
Earnings (in €) 562 1113 1060
(633) (687) (953)
Other benefits (in €) -283 -24 -66
(366) (298) (358)
Total income (in €) 1 251 -447
(617) (673) (943)
Nr of weeks I[Earnings > 0] 0.57 2.19 1.61
(2.12) (1.79) (2.10)
Cum. hours worked 36 101** 46
(53) (46) (58)
Mean hourly wage (in €) -0.69 1.79 3.03
(conditional on work) (1.80) (1.50) (2.14)
Observations 1011 1007 770
Included controls:
Quarter of registration Yes Yes Yes
Location of registration Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each row in this table represents one regression including interactions for the diﬀerent
subgroups. All regressions include controls for age at registration, gender, household composi-
tion and cumulative income 24 months before registration. ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at
5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level.
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Table 4.iii: Characteristics of diﬀerent groups of compliers
Nev<20% Nev<10% Nev<10%
Alw>40% Alw>40% Alw>60%
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Partner 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Children 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Age 31 - 36 -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Age 37 - 45 -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
Age above 45 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)** 0.05 (0.03)*
Bachelor/Master -0.04 (0.02) * -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
Vocational -0.03 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
High school 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Prep. vocational 0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03)
Education missing -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Inc. 2 yrs before (x1000€) 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Location: Southeast 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.25 (0.02)*** -0.32 (0.03)***
Location: North 0.03 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)***
Location: Center/East 0.02 (0.02) 0.19 (0.02)*** 0.11 (0.03)***
Location: New West -0.01 (0.02) 0.17 (0.03)*** 0.02 (0.03)
Quarter 2 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
Quarter 3 -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03)**
Quarter 4 -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
Number of observations 2788 2788 2788
Note: ⇤⇤⇤ =significant at 1% level, ⇤⇤ =at 5% level, ⇤ =at 10% level
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4.B Appendix figures
0
10
20
30
Fl
ow
s (
x1
00
0)
-5
0
5
10
15
GD
P 
gr
ow
th
 (%
)
2008q3 2010q1 2011q3 2013q1 2014q3
GDP growth Outflow welfare
Inflow welfare
Figure 4.i: In- and outflow of welfare from 2011-2014 (source: Statistics Nether-
lands)
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Figure 4.ii: IV estimates of the eﬀects of a search period by age and gender t  ⌧
weeks after registration (colored areas are 90 percent confidence intervals)
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5
Summary and conclusions
This thesis consists of three empirical studies investigating policy questions in the
field of labor economics and economics of education. This chapter summarizes
the main findings and conclusions from the previous chapters and discusses their
policy implications.
The first chapter uses the admission lotteries for medical school to estimate
the returns to medical school. In the public debate about doctors’ remuneration,
three reasons are often mentioned for higher earnings of doctors. First, doctors are
more motivated and more able than average university students. Second, doctors
have a higher human capital investment because they spend more time in school
and third, doctors work more hours. We find that completing medical school has
a large positive eﬀect on labor market outcomes. Doctors have a much higher
income than people that lost the admission lottery to medical school. Because of
the lottery, these people should be similarly motivated and able as doctors. Only
a small part of this earnings diﬀerence can be explained by longer working hours
or more investment in human capital. The larger share of the earnings diﬀerence
probably reflects monopoly rents due to restricted supply of physicians in the
Netherlands.
Releasing the quota might reduce the returns to medical school, but is costly
in a situation in which the government heavily subsidizes study costs, as is cur-
rently the case in the Netherlands. In addition, public expenditures on health
care costs might also increase, due to supplier-induced demand. However, one
might question whether the coexistence of high private returns and high public
investment is desirable. Policy makers can either consider setting a cap on the
earnings levels of medical professionals or shift part of the study costs to students
by raising tuition fees. Our results suggest that there is suﬃcient scope for med-
ical school students in the Netherlands to pay higher tuition fees. This might
also allow the government to increase the number of available places without
increasing public expenditures.
Chapter 3 reports on a field experiment testing for sunk-cost eﬀects in an edu-
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cation setting. Students signing up for extra-curricular tutorial sessions randomly
received a discount on the tuition fee. The sunk-cost eﬀect predicts that students
who pay more will attend more tutorial sessions, with possibly beneficial eﬀects
on their performance. For our full sample, we find no support for this hypothe-
sis, neither on attendance nor on performance. The results are consistent with a
sunk-cost eﬀect for the subsample of students who, based on hypothetical survey
questions, are identified as sunk-cost prone. We do not find diﬀerential eﬀects by
students’ income or parental contributions. The field experiment in this chapter
is comparable to earlier field experiments that did not find evidence of sunk-cost
eﬀects. However, in our experiment we tried to give the sunk-cost hypothesis a
better chance by, among others, oﬀering higher discounts. Despite these eﬀorts,
we find no evidence of such eﬀects for our full sample.
Chapter 4 investigates the eﬀect of mandatory search periods for applicants
of welfare benefits. A search period can aﬀect labor market outcomes in several
ways. First, the job search requirement can increase the likelihood to find a
job. Second, a search period makes the application process for welfare benefits
more complex and increases the transaction costs of applying. Both mechanisms
can serve as a self-selection or screening device, but possibly aﬀect a diﬀerent
part of the population. An increase in the job finding rate will reduce take up
of applicants with good outside opportunities while increased complexity could
scare away applicants that did not find a job but are not able to deal with the
complexity of the application process. The question is whether the search period
screens out the right people.
We find that a search period reduces the likelihood to collect welfare benefits,
and the reduced income from welfare benefits is fully compensated (112%) by
higher earnings. This suggests that a search period does screen out the right
applicants. This is further confirmed by subgroup analysis: the eﬀect of a search
period increases with education and there is no evidence of negative side eﬀects
for the most vulnerable applicants. This chapter shows that through stricter
job search requirements and an increase in the complexity of the application
process the take-up of welfare benefits can be significantly reduced. Since the
monetary costs of applying a search period are minimal, it is a cost-eﬀective
policy instrument.
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Samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
Steeds vaker wordt gevraagd om “evidence-based” beleid, met een wetenschap-
pelijke onderbouwing van de causale eﬀecten. Om het causale eﬀect van bepaald
beleid te meten dient de uitkomst met de interventie vergeleken te worden met
de uitkomst zonder de interventie. Per definitie wordt altijd slechts één van deze
twee uitkomsten geobserveerd. Veldexperimenten of natuurlijke experimenten,
waarin willekeurig bepaald wordt wie een bepaalde interventie krijgt, zijn een
overtuigende manier om het eﬀect van beleid te meten. Alle drie de studies in
dit proefschrift maken gebruik van deze methoden, om eﬀecten te schatten van
zowel onderwijs- als arbeidsmarktbeleid.
Hoofdstuk 2 gebruikt de toelatingslotingen voor geneeskunde om de opbreng-
sten van een medische opleiding te schatten. In het publieke debat over de be-
loning van artsen worden meerdere redenen genoemd voor de hoge inkomens van
artsen. Geneeskunde studenten zouden gemiddeld gemotiveerdere en betere stu-
denten zijn. Verder wordt vaak gewezen op de lange opleiding die nodig is om
medisch specialist te worden en het grote aantal uren dat artsen zouden werken.
Binnen lotingsgroepen kan de randomisatie van de loterij gebruikt worden om de
opbrengsten van een geneeskundestudie te schatten. Hierdoor kunnen we de ar-
beidsmarktuitkomsten van medici vergelijken met de arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van
mensen die op het moment van loting gemiddeld genomen vergelijkbaar waren.
Om te corrigeren voor het feit dat niet alle ingelote studenten de studie afmaken
en dat sommige uitgelote studenten het jaar erop weer meedoen met de loting en
dan wel toegelaten worden gebruiken we een instrumentele variabele model.
We vinden dat het doen van een geneeskundestudie een erg groot positief
eﬀect heeft op arbeidsmarktuitkomsten. Medici hebben een hoger inkomen dan
mensen die uitgeloot zijn voor de geneeskundestudie, wat voornamelijk komt door
een veel hoger uurloon. Het extra inkomen van medici is veel hoger dan de ver-
loren inkomsten die medici hebben door een langere studie. Onze bevindingen
suggereren dat medici hoge monopolie rents hebben als gevolg van de beperkte
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toegang tot de medische professie. Een oplossing zou zijn om de numerus fixus
voor de geneeskundestudie aan te passen zodat er het aantal geneeskundestuden-
ten toe kan nemen en er daarmee meer concurrentie komt op de arbeidsmarkt voor
medici. Deze oplossing zou echter kostbaar kunnen zijn omdat een geneeskun-
destudie duur is en omdat een toename van het aantal medisch specialisten kan
leiden tot meer medische behandelingen. Het alternatief is om de hoge private
opbrengsten af te romen. De overheid kan ervoor kiezen het salaris van medici te
maximeren, of om medici meer te laten betalen voor hun opleiding. Dat laatste
kan door het collegegeld van een geneeskundestudie substantieel te verhogen of
om medici zelf te laten betalen voor hun specialisatie.
In het derde hoofdstuk kijken we met behulp van een veldexperiment naar het
eﬀect van de hoogte van collegegeld op de tijd en moeite die studenten steken
in hun studie. Centraal staat hierbij de vraag of studenten bij deze beslissing
rekening houden met verzonken kosten (sunk-cost eﬀect). Dit zijn kosten die al
gemaakt zijn en niet meer ongedaan te maken zijn. In het experiment werden
willekeurig kortingen van verschillende omvang gegeven aan studenten die zich
hadden ingeschreven voor bijlessen. Het sunk-cost eﬀect voorspelt dat studenten
die meer betalen vaker naar de lessen komen, met mogelijk ook positieve eﬀecten
op hun onderwijsresultaten.
Voor de volledige steekproef vinden we geen bewijs voor deze hypothese. Zowel
de aanwezigheid als het onderwijsresultaat is gemiddeld niet anders voor studen-
ten met verschillende kortingen. Voor de groep studenten die in een hypothetische
situatie gevoelig is voor het sunk-cost eﬀect (45% van de studenten) lijkt er wel
een sunk-cost eﬀect te zijn. Er is geen bewijs dat het eﬀect verschillend is voor
studenten met een hoger inkomen of voor studenten van wie de ouders betalen
voor de bijlessen. Het veldexperiment in dit hoofdstuk is vergelijkbaar van opzet
met eerdere veldexperimenten die geen bewijs vonden voor het sunk-cost eﬀect.
Echter, in ons experiment kreeg het sunk-cost eﬀect een grotere kans, onder an-
dere door het aanbieden van grotere kortingen. Desalniettemin vinden we geen
bewijs voor het sunk-cost eﬀect voor de volledige steekproef.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt het eﬀect van het geven van een verplichte zoekpe-
riode aan mensen die zich melden voor een bijstandsuitkering. Een zoekperiode
stelt de behandeling van de uitkeringsaanvraag met maximaal vier weken uit
en verplicht de werkloze tijdens deze periode actief naar werk te zoeken. Deze
zoekverplichting kan de kans dat een aanvrager een baan vindt vergroten. Een
ander gevolg van de zoekperiode is dat de aanvraag van een bijstandsuitkering
lastiger is waardoor er hogere transactie kosten zijn. Beide mechanismen kunnen
het aantal toegekende bijstandsuitkeringen verlagen, maar ze beïnvloeden mo-
gelijk verschillende typen aanvragers. De verhoogde baankans is waarschijnlijk
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vooral van toepassing op aanvragers met een goede positie op de arbeidsmarkt
terwijl de verhoogde complexiteit van de bijstandsaanvraag aanvragers af kan
schrikken die geen baan hebben gevonden maar niet goed kunnen omgaan met
de complexiteit van de aanvraag. De vraag is daarom of een zoekperiode de kans
op een bijstandsuitkering verlaagt voor de juiste personen.
We vinden dat het opleggen van een zoekperiode de kans op het ontvangen
van een bijstandsuitkering verlaagt. Gemiddeld is er voor deze individuen geen
eﬀect op totaal inkomen, omdat het verloren bedrag aan bijstandsuitkering wordt
opgevangen door meer verdiensten uit werk. Dit suggereert dat de zoekperiode
werkt als een selectiemechanisme dat er voor zorgt dat mensen met een goed
alternatief geen bijstandsuitkering ontvangen. Dit wordt verder bevestigd door
te kijken naar subgroepen. De zoekperiode is eﬀectiever voor aanvragers met
een hogere opleiding en we vinden geen bewijs voor een negatief bijeﬀect op de
meest kwetsbare aanvragers. Het signaal dat een zoekperiode afgeeft - dat het
ontvangen van bijstand samenvalt met de verplichting om werk te zoeken - lijkt
daarom erg eﬀectief.
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The chapters of this thesis focus on policy-relevant research questions in 
economics of education and labor economics. All chapters make use of randomized 
experiments in order to answer these questions. The second chapter studies 
the returns to medical school in a regulated labor market, by exploiting that 
admittance to medical school in the Netherlands is determined by a lottery. 
The returns to medical school are of particular interest because in the 
Netherlands, and in most countries, the medical profession is highly regulated. 
In chapter three the sunk-costs fallacy in education is investigated, by conducting 
a field experiment with university students. Finally, the third chapter is based 
on a large-scale field experiment that was conducted at the welfare agency in 
Amsterdam. The experiment was set up to evaluate the effect of welfare-to-
work programs on benefit dependency. 
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